Countering weapons of mass destruction: a preliminary field study in improving collaboration by Lothringer, Derek W. et al.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis and Dissertation Collection
2016-03
Countering weapons of mass destruction: a
preliminary field study in improving collaboration
Lothringer, Derek W.










CAPSTONE PROJECT REPORT  
 
Approved for public release; distribution unlimited 
COUNTERING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION: A 





CWMD Capstone Team 
Derek W. Lothringer 
Matthew S. McGraw 
Matthew D. Rautio 
Leif H.K. Thaxton 
 
March 2016 
Project Advisor:  Leo Blanken 
Co-Advisor: Zachary Davis 
Second Reader: John Dillard 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 i 
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB  
No. 0704–0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing 
instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection 
of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including 
suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 
Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork 
Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington, DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY 
(Leave blank) 
2. REPORT DATE   
March 2016 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Capstone project report 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE   
COUNTERING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION: A PRELIMINARY 
FIELD STUDY IN IMPROVING COLLABORATION 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
 
6. AUTHOR(S)  CWMD Capstone Team: Derek W. Lothringer, Matthew 
S. McGraw, Matthew D. Rautio, Leif H.K. Thaxton 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  93943-5000 
8. PERFORMING 
ORGANIZATION REPORT 
NUMBER     
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND 
ADDRESS(ES) 
Assistant Secretary of Defense (NBC/CWMD) 
10. SPONSORING / 
MONITORING  AGENCY 
REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES  The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the 
official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. IRB Protocol number ____N/A____. 
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT   
Approved for public release; distribution unlimited 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE  
 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)  
 
The proliferation of emerging and disruptive technologies such as additive manufacturing continues 
unabated. Such trends vastly increase the likelihood of a pernicious non-state actor acquiring weapons of 
mass destruction in the near future. In addition, these emerging novel threats have proved particularly 
vexing for the existing U.S. bureaucracies. Absent the major restructuring of the government, significantly 
higher levels of proactive inter-agency collaboration will be required to successfully respond to these 
grave challenges. In this project, we first operationalized a concept of collaboration in terms of increases in 
transparency, resource sharing, and interdependence across inter-agency actors. In other words, actors are 
deemed to be collaborating when they share information, make assets available to one another, and 
become jointly invested in (and responsible for) the resulting decisions. Second, we explored if the use of 
a formal collaborative process and the choice of venue would have significant impacts on the degree of 
collaboration observed. A preliminary field study conducted at the U.S. Embassy in Singapore confirmed 
our intuitions regarding increased collaboration, and provided the springboard for additional research, as 




14. SUBJECT TERMS  
counterproliferation, weapons of mass destruction, collaboration, disruptive innovation, lean 
thinking, additive manufacturing, opportunity analysis, technology diffusion, embassy 
15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES  
111 

















NSN 7540–01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2–89)  
 Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239–18 
 ii 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 iii 
Approved for public release; distribution unlimited 
 
 
COUNTERING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION: A PRELIMINARY 
FIELD STUDY IN IMPROVING COLLABORATION 
 
 
CWMD Capstone Team 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
 
 
MASTER OF SCIENCE IN DEFENSE ANALYSIS 
 
Lieutenant Commander Derek W. Lothringer, United States Navy 
Commander Matthew S. McGraw, United States Navy 
Lieutenant Matthew D. Rautio, United States Navy 




MASTER OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION 
 
Lieutenant Commander Derek W. Lothringer, United States Navy 











Leo Blanken, Ph.D.  Zachary Davis, Ph.D.   John Dillard 
Project Advisor  Co-Advisor    Second Reader  
 
 
John Arquilla, Ph.D.      Don Summers 
Chair, Department of Defense Analysis Academic Associate, 
Graduate School of Business and 
Public Policy 
 iv 




The proliferation of emerging and disruptive technologies such as additive 
manufacturing continues unabated. Such trends vastly increase the likelihood of a 
pernicious non-state actor acquiring weapons of mass destruction in the near future. In 
addition, these emerging novel threats have proved particularly vexing for the existing 
U.S. bureaucracies. Absent the major restructuring of the government, significantly 
higher levels of proactive inter-agency collaboration will be required to successfully 
respond to these grave challenges. In this project, we first operationalized a concept of 
collaboration in terms of increases in transparency, resource sharing, and interdependence 
across inter-agency actors. In other words, actors are deemed to be collaborating when 
they share information, make assets available to one another, and become jointly invested 
in (and responsible for) the resulting decisions. Second, we explored if the use of a 
formal collaborative process and the choice of venue would have significant impacts on 
the degree of collaboration observed. A preliminary field study conducted at the U.S. 
Embassy in Singapore confirmed our intuitions regarding increased collaboration, and 




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 vii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................1 
A. WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND THE NEED TO 
COLLABORATE: DESCRIBING THE PROBLEM ............................2 
B. THE EVOLVING PROLIFERATION THREAT ..................................4 
C. CWMD DEFINITIONS AND DOCTRINE ............................................6 
D. DISRUPTIVE INNOVATION AND PROLIFERATION .....................7 
E. MARKET DISRUPTION .........................................................................7 
F. THE DISRUPTORS ..................................................................................9 
G. ADDITIVE MANUFACTURING ..........................................................11 
H. WHY INTERAGENCY COLLABORATION?....................................13 
I. RESEARCH STATEMENT AND QUESTIONS .................................14 
J. SCOPE OF RESEARCH ........................................................................15 
K. OUTLINE OF PROJECT .......................................................................16 
II. EXISTING LITERATURE ON COLLABORATION ....................................19 
A. DEFINING COLLABORATION...........................................................19 
B. THE ROLE OF INFORMATION .........................................................20 
C. THE ROLE OF INTERESTS .................................................................22 
D. OPERATIONALIZATION OF COLLABORATION .........................25 
E. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................27 
III. LESSONS GLEANED FROM THE MARKETPLACE ABOUT THE 
UTILITY OF A FORMAL COLLABORATIVE PROCESS .........................29 
A. INSIGHTS FROM THE PRIVATE SECTOR .....................................29 
B. THE UTILITY OF INTEGRATED TEAMS .......................................31 
C. RECONSTRUING THE “INPUTS/OUTPUTS” OF 
COLLABORATION................................................................................32 
D. INTRODUCING A FORMAL PROCESS: OPPORTUNITY 
ANALYSIS ...............................................................................................34 
E. THE IMPACT OF VENUE ....................................................................37 
F. RESEARCH DESIGN .............................................................................38 
G. CONCLUSIONS ......................................................................................39 
IV. EXPLORATORY FIELD STUDY: INTERAGENCY OPPORTUNITY 
ANALYSIS ...........................................................................................................41 
A. ACTIONABLE SOLUTIONS SPECIFIC TO THE SCENARIO ......43 




2. Resource Provision.......................................................................50 
3. Interdependence ...........................................................................51 
C. OPPORTUNITY ANALYSIS CONCLUSION .....................................53 
V. CONCLUSIONS ..................................................................................................57 
A. RECOMMENDATIONS .........................................................................61 
B. WAY FORWARD ....................................................................................62 
1. Online U.S. Interagency Counterproliferation 
Collaboration Environment ........................................................63 
2. Institutionalization of Opportunity Analysis across the 
U.S. Interagency ...........................................................................63 
3. SOF Outreach to Interagency Partners .....................................64 
APPENDIX A.  CONSTRUCTING THE CONCEPT OF COLLABORATION ......65 
A. DIMENSION 1: TRANSPARENCY .......................................................65 
B. DIMENSION 2: RESOURCES ...............................................................67 
C. DIMENSION 3: INTERDEPENDENCE ...............................................69 
APPENDIX B.  CONCEPT DIMENSIONS AND INDICATORS ..............................73 
A. DIMENSION 1: TRANSPARENCY .......................................................73 
B. DIMENSION 2: RESOURCES ...............................................................73 
C. DIMENSION 3: INTERDEPENDENCE ...............................................74 
LIST OF REFERENCES ................................................................................................75 




LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1. Disruptive Innovations Entry Point Model ..................................................8 
Figure 2. Interagency CP Collaboration Concept Model ..........................................33 
Figure 3. OA Nodal Dissection Technique Macro (Example) ..................................35 
Figure 4. OA Nodal Dissection Technique Micro (Example)...................................36 
Figure 5. Concept-Indicator Validity Model .............................................................65 
 
 x 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xi 
LIST OF TABLES 




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xiii 
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
AM additive manufacturing 
BIS Bureau of Industry and Security 
CIA Central Intelligence Agency 
CWMD countering weapons of mass destruction 
CP counterproliferation 
CPWG Counterproliferation Working Group 
CT counterterrorism 
DHS Department of Homeland Security 
DIMEFIL diplomatic, information, military, economic, financial, 
 intelligence, law enforcement 
DOC Department of Commerce 
DOD Department of Defense 
DOS Department of State 
DPRK Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation 
FLETC federal law enforcement training center 
FSI Foreign Service Institute 
IA U.S. Interagency 
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency 
IAWG interagency working group 
IND improvised nuclear device 
IOA Interagency Opportunity Analysis 
ISIL Islamic State Iraq and Levant 
LOE lines of effort 
NCPC National Counterproliferation Center 
NCR National Capital Region (Washington, DC) 
ODTAAC outside declared theater of active armed conflict 
OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense 
PSI proliferation security initiative 
SOCOM Special Operations Command 
 xiv 
SOF Special Operations Forces 
TCO transnational criminal organization 
TRAC Threat Reduction and Arms Control 
TTX tabletop exercise 
USG United States government 
USCENTCOM United States Central Command 
USSOCPAC United States Special Operations Command Pacific  
  
 xv 
LIST OF DEFINITIONS 
Additive manufacturing: The automated process of turning digital design into three-
dimensional products.1 From industry, it is the process of joining materials to make 
objects from three dimensional data, usually layer upon layer, as opposed to subtractive 
manufacturing methodologies.2 
 
Countering weapons of mass destruction (CWMD): Efforts against actors of concern 
to curtail the conceptualization, development, possession, proliferation, use, and effects 
of weapons of mass destruction, related expertise, materials, technologies, and means of 
delivery. Also called CWMD.3 
 
Counterproliferation: Those actions taken to reduce the risks posed by extant weapons 
of mass destruction to the United States, allies, and partners. Also called CP.4 
 
Collaboration: When people from different organizations (or units within one 
organization) produce something together through joint effort, resources, and decision 
making, and share ownership of the final product or service.5 
  
                                                 
1 Jennifer Snow, “Entering the Matrix: The Challenge of Regulating Radical Leveling Technologies” 
(master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2015), 1. 
2 “What Is Additive Manufacturing.” Informational. Wohlers Associates. Accessed December 10, 
2015. https://www.wohlersassociates.com/additive-manufacturing.html. 
3 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Publication 3–40: Countering Weapons of Mass 
Destruction. Department of Defense. Washington, DC, 2014. 
4 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Publication 3–40: Countering Weapons of Mass 
Destruction. Department of Defense. Washington, DC, 2014. 
5 Russell M. Lindon, Working Across Boundaries, San Francisco, CA: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 
(2002), 7. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
[As] we tackle the many threats to our national security, we must never 
lose sight of nation’s enduring strengths—or of the opportunities to make 
a brighter future and better world for our children. 
—Secretary of Defense Ash Carter6 
 
Some crises can be construed as simply the result of a series of missed 
opportunities to collaborate. The U.S. government (USG) is constantly reacting to 
national security crises on multiple fronts, and the most frightening type of crisis the 
nation could face is one in which its most dangerous adversaries acquire weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD) or significantly enhance their current stockpile. The White House 
acknowledges the gravity of such a scenario: “No threat poses as grave a danger to our 
security and wellbeing as the potential use of nuclear weapons and materials by 
irresponsible states or terrorists.”7 Disturbingly, the likelihood of such a crisis increases 
every day as rapidly emerging technological innovation and diffusion mechanisms lower 
the barriers for entry into the WMD club.8 
Neither the Department of Defense (DOD) nor any other specific U.S. agency 
bears full responsibility for devising a strategy to deter innovative adversaries from 
achieving strategic effects including the use of WMD. The existing national security 
bureaucracies, designed in the immediate wake of World War II, were structured to 
counter other nation state bureaucracies.9 Today’s threats are much more agile and often 
operate below a U.S. response threshold. Built at the apex of interstate diplomacy and 
industrialized warfare, they have been slow to react to—or even recognize—the relevant 
                                                 
6 Carter, Ashton, “Message from Secretary Ashton Carter to all DOD personnel,” Secretary of Defense 
Message Washington, D.C.; February 17, 2015. 
7 White House, “National Security Strategy 2015.” 
8 Jennifer Snow, “Entering the Matrix: The Challenge of Regulating Radical Leveling Technologies” 
(master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2015). 
9 U.S. Congress, The National Security Act of 1947 (1947). 
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attributes of the emerging threat environment.10 Further, today’s adversaries actively 
exploit such departmental seams across the range of USG agencies.11 Given the nature of 
this challenge, interagency collaboration will prove crucial to mitigating over-the-horizon 
threats and ultimately limiting the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. As noted 
by John Arquilla, “We can’t control everything, but we can control how we organize, 
communicate, and operate.”12 This thesis explores how a formal collaborative process 
can enhance such counterproliferation efforts. 
A. WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND THE NEED TO 
COLLABORATE: DESCRIBING THE PROBLEM 
Weapons of mass destruction are one of the few existential threats to U.S. 
national security and economic prosperity. Despite the loss of the World Trade Center 
and over three thousand citizens 14 years ago, New York City is once again a bustling 
center of economic health. In comparison, approximately 70,000 people were killed 
instantly, nearly 43 square miles were affected by radiation, and 100% of the 50,000 
buildings in Nagasaki were destroyed in August 1945 following the use of a nuclear 
weapon at the end of World War II.13 An improvised nuclear device (IND)14—a type of 
WMD actively sought by terrorist groups—can produce a similar explosive yield.15 
References to WMD can be found in every National Security Strategy Report since the 
                                                 
10 Douglas T. Stuart, Creating the National Security State: A History of the Law That Transformed 
America (Princeton University Press, 2012). 
11 Amy Zegart, Flawed by Design: The Evolution of the CIA, JCS, and NSC (Stanford University 
Press, 2000). 
12 John Arquilla, personal communication with authors, 3 October 2015. 
13 “The Atomic Bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki,” Atomicarchive.com, 1998, 
http://www.atomicarchive.com/Docs/MED/med_chp9.shtml. 
14 According to Ferguson and Potter, an improvised nuclear device (IND) is a nuclear weapon made 
with fissile materials acquired from nontraditional means—to include criminal activity, extortion, etc.—and 
crude fabrication of an explosive device to gain nuclear yield. 
15 “It is generally assumed that successful INDs would have yields in the ten to 20 kiloton range (the 
equivalent to 10,000–20,000 tons of TNT), while INDs that fizzled—i.e., did not detonate fully—might 
still produce a nuclear yield that could cause very significant damage. A 20 kiloton yield would be the 
equivalent of the yield of the bomb that destroyed Nagasaki and could devastate the heart of a medium-
sized U.S. city, while causing fire and radiation damage over a considerably wider area” (Charles D. 
Ferguson and William C. Potter, Improvised Nuclear Devices and Nuclear Terrorism, WMD Commission, 
Stockholm, Sweden, 2006). 
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Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 directed the report to be published by the Executive 
Cabinet.16 This pervasive concern is not invalid: according to the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA), between 1993 and 2013, over six hundred incidents of theft or 
losses of fissile material have been reported, with no conclusive determinations of 
whether the items were sold.17  
It can be argued that the United States, along with international partners, has been 
largely successful in blunting the proliferation of WMDs. This argument is supported by 
the fact that there are only ten nations with declared nuclear weapons programs, despite 
the technology’s 70-year history.18 Nonetheless, international actors have found means to 
illicitly develop such programs. The A.Q. Khan network, which developed Pakistan’s 
nuclear program, for example, has demonstrated the path to illicit nuclear proliferation.19  
The proliferation threat is poised to grow rapidly as the challenge evolves over the 
next few years. New disruptive technology has a significant impact on illicit proliferation 
of WMD and the USG’s agility to respond to new and emerging threats. The nuclear fuel 
cycle has traditionally proven to be resource intensive and require a significant 
production footprint, but advancements like additive manufacturing, commonly known as 
“AM” or “3D printing,” offer alternative methods that can be diffused to a broader range 
of adversaries and can create critical components for boutique nuclear programs.20 Those 
                                                 
16 Barry Goldwater and Flyt Nichols, Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act 
of 1986, 1986. 
17 Evan Perez, Michael Martinez, and Cosmin Stan, “FBI Helped Thwart Nuclear Smuggling Plot in 
Moldova,” CNN Politics, October 8, 2015, http://www.cnn.com/2015/10/07/politics/fbi-helped-thwart-
nuclear-smuggling-plot-in-moldova/. 
18 “Nuclear Weapons: Who Has What at a Glance,” Arms Control Association, October 2015, 
http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Nuclearweaponswhohaswhat. 
19 Gordon Corera, Shopping for Bombs: Nuclear Proliferation, Global Insecurity, and the Rise and 
Fall of the AQ Khan Network (Oxford University Press, 2009). 
20 Alexander Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective: A Book of Essays 
(Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1962); John Arquilla, “Patterns of Commercial 
Diffusion,” in Diffusion of Military Technology and Ideas, ed. Emily O. Goldman and Leslie C. Eliason 
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003); Michael Roberts, The Military Revolution, 1560–1660: 
An Inaugural Lecture Delivered before the Queen’s University of Belfast (Marjory Boyd: Belfast, 1956), 
32; Dr. Leo Blanken, conversation with authors, October 2015. 
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pieces of the puzzle that used to require national-level industrial efforts may be possible 
to complete in a disused warehouse in the coming years. 
The U.S. Interagency (IA) is the president’s authorized means of implementing 
and enforcing U.S. policies, laws, and treaties. In the vacuum created after the fall of the 
Soviet Union in the 1990s, there seemed no immediate need for departmental 
reorganization or resource pooling to counter or combat emerging counterproliferation 
threats.21 As a result, there are gaps between departments organized to counter an 
outdated Cold War peer-competitor threat.22 The IA has made significant strides in 
coordination and cooperation since 2001; however, terror groups and observant nation-
states have learned to exploit what General Votel, commander of USSOCOM, describes 
as a “gray zone” just below the U.S. response threshold where fissures in the IA are 
vulnerable.23 
Given these three premises—the existential threat of WMDs, the precipitous 
lowering of the proliferation threshold, and the mismatch between these threats and the 
Cold War-legacy structure of USG bureaucracies—the key to counterproliferation may 
lie in fostering IA collaboration before crises emerge.  
B. THE EVOLVING PROLIFERATION THREAT 
Since 1949, the United States has wielded national power to prevent the 
proliferation of strategic weaponry through passive and active measures.24 A blend of 
strategies of retaliatory deterrence, deterrence by denial, economic pressure, and legal 
                                                 
21 Emily Goldman, Power in Uncertain Times: Strategy in the Fog of Peace (Stanford University 
Press, 2010). 
22 The National Commission of Terrorist Attacks on the United States, also known as the 9/11 
Commission, confirmed the stovepiped nature of the USG institutions; see 9/11 Commission Report – in Lit 
Rev. 
23 Statement of General Joseph L. Votel, U.S. Army, Commander, United States Special Operations 
Command Before The House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and 
Capabilities, Washington, DC, U.S. House of Representatives, 2015, 7, 
http://fas.org/irp/congress/2015_hr/031815votel.pdf. 
24 Henry Sokolski, Underestimated: Our Not-So-Peaceful Nuclear Future (Arlington, Virginia: 
Nonproliferation Education Center, 2015); Albert O. Hirschman, National Power and the Structure of 
Foreign Trade (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1980); Mills, “All Elements of National 
Power: Re-Organizing the Interagency Structure and Process for Victory in the Long War,” 2006. 
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arms-control regimes are but a few examples of such efforts.25 Despite these measures, 
WMD still pose an existential threat to U.S. security. Further, there is a growing concern 
that the barrier to developing and owning such weapons will lower drastically as new 
technologies emerge, making existing methods of deterrence and CWMD less and less 
effective.26 Disruptive innovation, rapid technological advances, and diffusion of 
innovations to a broader population could undermine defense and political strategies if 
nothing is done to improve efforts against such threats.27 Three-dimensional additive 
manufacturing, combined with cyber connectivity, is an area in which technology 
advancement is outpacing the U.S. bureaucratic agencies’ abilities to defend against 
potential threats.28 The result is limited awareness and action to realize or react to threats 
                                                 
25 T. C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966); “1971 
Pentagon Papers,” National Archives and Records, 1971: 412–429, accessed November 10, 2015, 
http://www.archives.gov/research/pentagon-papers/; Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence 
in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974); G. T. 
Allison and P. D. Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, 2nd ed. (New York, 
NY: Addison-Wesley Publications, 1999); Brian Bates and Chris McHorney, Developing a Theoretical 
Model of Counterproliferation for the 21st Century (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 2000); Andrew 
Grossman, Neither Dead nor Red: Civil Defense and American Political Development during the Early 
Cold War (Routledge, 2001). 
26 Zachary S. Davis, “Strategic Latency and World Order,” Orbis, 2014, 69–84; Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction (Washington, DC: USGPO, 2014), 
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_40.pdf.  
27 Roberts, Military Revolution, 1560–1660; Arquilla, “Patterns of Commercial Diffusion”; Clayton 
M. Christensen, The Innovator’s Dilemma: When New Technologies Cause Great Firms to Fail (Boston, 
MA: Harvard Business School Press, 1997). 
28 Bruce Goodwin, “Additive Manufacturing and High-Performance Computing: A Disruptive Latent 
Technology,” Center for Nonproliferation Studies, September 8, 2015, 
http://www.nonproliferation.org/additive-manufacturing-and-high-performance-computing/; Anne Sneed, 
“Moore’s Law Keeps Going, Defying Expectations,” Scientific American, May 19, 2015, accessed 
November 10, 2015, http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/moore-s-law-keeps-going-defying-
expectations/; Rose Brooke, “China Flexes Muscles in 3D Printing Race,” TCT Magazine, 2013, 
http://www.tctmagazine.com/3D-printing-news/china-flexes-muscles-in-3dp-race/; Liat Clark, “Disarming 
Corrupter Distorts 3D Printing Files for Sharing of Banned Items,” Wired, November 5, 2013, 
http://www.wired.co.uk/news/archive/2013-11/05/disarming-corruptor; RedEye on Demand Hanson, “Top 
Five Benefits of Additive Manufacturing (You Never Considered),” Manufacturing.net, February 19, 2013, 
http://www.manufacturing.net/articles/2013/02/top-five-benefits-of-additive-manufacturing-you-never-
considered; Brian Krassenstein, “The Moore’s Law of 3D Printing…Yes it Does Exist, and Could Have 
Staggering Implications,” Print.com, 2014, http://3dprint.com/7543/3d-printing-moores-law/; “A Third 
Industrial Revolution,” The Economist, 2012, http://www.economist.com/node/21552901; Wohler 
Associates, Wohlers Report 2015, 2015, http://www.wohlersassociates.com/2015report.htm; Connor M. 
McNulte, Neyla Arnas, Thomas Campbell, “Toward the Printed World: Additive Manufacturing and 




until they become crises. As observed by David Kilcullen, political and defense leaders 
are simply too overwhelmed and overtasked to do anything more than manage current 
crises.29 If current methods of ad hoc collaboration and interorganizational challenges are 
not overcome, the next crisis just might be the nightmare of the “nuclear 9/11.”  
To delineate the aspects of this challenge, we provide some context and 
background on the evolution of counterproliferation efforts in U.S. foreign policy. We 
begin by providing some basic background, terms and doctrine in regards to this topic. 
We next look at the attributes of disruptive innovation models from the private sector, 
and how largely unforeseen challengers can threaten traditional market leaders. Finally, 
we focus in on one example of such a disruptive—additive manufacturing—and its grave 
implications for WMD proliferation.  
C. CWMD DEFINITIONS AND DOCTRINE 
It is useful to pause and provide some basic definitions before proceeding. 
Weapons of mass destruction are defined as chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or 
high-yield explosives, and there have been a number of concerted efforts to counter 
malign actors’ acquisition of WMD expertise, technology, and material and weapon 
proliferation.30 Joint Publication 3–40 introduces a WMD construct of three applicable 
lines of effort: 1. prevent acquisition; 2. contain and reduce threats; and 3. respond to 
crises.31 The overarching strategy to meet these three Lines of Effort is identified in 
military doctrine as preparation.32 The act of preparation must take place in the steady 
state, where we focus our analysis. The term counterproliferation (CP) falls under the 
                                                 
29 David Killcullen, “Psychological Warfare and Deception,” lecture, Naval Postgraduate School, 
August 13, 2015; Michael R. Eastman, “Whole of Government Is Half an Answer,” InterAgency Journal 3, 
no. 3 (Summer 2012), 31–39; Sean M. Roche, “Is It Time for an Interagency Goldwater-Nichols Act?” 
InterAgency Journal 4, no. 1 (Winter 2013), 12; Ralph O. Doughty and Ralph M. Erwin, “Building 
National Security through Interagency Cooperation: Opportunities and Challenges,” Changing Mindsets to 
Transform Security (Washington, DC: United States Institute for National Strategic Studies, 2013). 
30 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction; John Arquilla D. 
Ronfeldt, Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy (RAND, 2001); National 
Commission on Terrorist Attacks, The 9/11 Commission Report (Norton and Company, 2004). 
31 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction, iii.  
32 Ibid., I-3. 
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umbrella of CWMD as it pertains to the DOD mission. The IA generally uses the term 
counterproliferation and counterproliferation of weapons of mass destruction (CPWMD) 
but not CWMD.  
D. DISRUPTIVE INNOVATION AND PROLIFERATION 
To characterize the novel nature of current proliferation threats, we explore the 
“disruptive innovation” literature from the world of private sector competition. 
Disruptive innovations endanger existing markets or other arenas of competition. Often 
introduced by market outsiders, they may render existing value streams and sources of 
power obsolete. In short, disruptive innovations may rapidly and unexpectedly endanger 
an established order.33 An organization cannot stop the birth of disruptive innovations; 
hence, identification of the new threat and prevention or preparation for its diffusion is 
paramount.34 The advancement of atypical tactics and affordable new technology often 
outpaces a bureaucracy’s ability to prepare, identify or respond to threats in both private 
and public sector. This is ideal for new companies breaking into a large market—and for 
nefarious actors in search of WMD programs/materials. The need for more aggressive 
and effective ways of identifying and addressing new threats is only increasing. Just as 
the survival of commercial enterprises relies on their ability to identify such threats, it can 
be argued that the survival of nations depends on similarly enhanced threat assessment. 
E. MARKET DISRUPTION 
Clayton Christensen articulated a powerful theory of market disruption in 1997 
with his book The Innovator’s Dilemma, wherein he explains that disruptive innovation is 
not a breakthrough that makes good products better.35 Historically, firms invest in 
innovation through improving existing products and charging higher prices to boost 
profit; “however, by doing so, companies unwittingly open the door to ‘disruptive 
                                                 
33 Arquilla, “Patterns of Commercial Diffusion.” 
34 Roberts, Military Revolution, 1560–1660. 
35 The Innovator’s Dilemma received the Global Business Book Award as the best business book of 
the year (1997); and in 2011 The Economist named it as one of the six most important books about 
business ever written; Christensen, Innovator’s Dilemma. 
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innovations’ at the bottom of the market. An innovation that is disruptive allows a whole 
new population of consumers at the bottom of a market access to a product or service that 
was historically only accessible to consumers with a lot of money or a lot of skill.”36 (See 
Figure 1.) 
Figure 1.  Disruptive Innovations Entry Point Model 
 
Source: “Disruptive Innovation,” Clayton Christensen, July 10, 2012, accessed October 
8, 2015, http://www.claytonchristensen.com/key-concepts/. 
Disruptive innovation, as Clayton Christensen describes in his article “Disruptive 
Innovation,” is a: 
phenomenon by which an innovation transforms an existing market or 
sector by introducing simplicity, convenience, accessibility, and 
affordability where complication and high cost are the status quo. Initially, 
a disruptive innovation is formed in a niche market that may appear 
unattractive or inconsequential to industry incumbents, but eventually the 
new product or idea completely redefines the industry.37  
Disruptive innovations allow for smaller actors outside the established market to 
grow rapidly while not being observed by the established industry leader until it is 
                                                 
36 “Disruptive Innovation,” Clayton Christensen, July 10, 2012, accessed October 8, 2015, 
http://www.claytonchristensen.com/key-concepts/. 
37 Christensen, “Disruptive Innovation.” 
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already too late.38 The principle can be applied to multiple arenas, to include national 
security. An increased capability to assess threats is necessary to prevent, or at the very 
least be aware of, the introduction of simplicity, convenience, accessibility, and 
affordability to the market for WMD. 
F. THE DISRUPTORS 
Apple, with the introduction of computers for personal use, exemplified this 
strategy and quickly went from an unnoticed business in a garage to a worldwide market 
leader in a relatively short period of time.39 Unveiling of the new Apple motto, “Think 
different,” in 1997 revealed Steve Jobs as a disruptive innovator.40 Notably, he didn’t say 
“think better.” Looking to gain competitive advantage in the market, Apple accepted 
lower gross margins and simpler, less attractive products and services compared to 
traditional performance measures. Large firms like IBM that dominated the mainframe 
market did not see a reason to venture outside of their core competencies and focus on 
lower tiers of the market.41  Apple Computer’s used disruptive innovation to break into 
the personal computer industry: 
Apple … began selling its early computers … as … toy[s] for children. At 
that point, the product wasn’t good enough to compete with the 
minicomputers, but Apple’s customers didn’t care because they couldn’t 
afford or use the expensive minicomputers … Within a few years, the 
smaller, more affordable personal computer became good enough that it 
could do the work that previously required minicomputers. This created a 
huge new market and ultimately eliminated the existing industry.42  
IBM clearly did not see Apple as a threat to their bottom line. Yet by embracing what 
initially was a smaller market, Apple lowered the barriers to entry and eventually reached 
a much broader market. Table 1 depicts several examples where disruptive innovations 
                                                 
38 Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective. 
39 Christensen, “Disruptive Innovation.” 
40 Walter Isaacson, “The Real Leadership Lessons of Steve Jobs,” Harvard Business Review, April 1, 
2012, accessed October 8, 2015. 
41 Gerard J. Tellis, Unrelenting Innovation: How to Build a Culture for Market Dominance (San 
Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2013). 
42 Christensen, “Disruptive Innovation.” 
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allowed weaker competitors to surprise and disadvantage leaders within their respective 
market/environment.  
Table 1.   Examples of Disruptive Innovations 
Disruptor Disrupted 
Apple Mainframe Computers, Phones, Music Industry 
Netflix Movie Rental Industry 
Uber Transportation Service Industry 
Airbnb Hospitality Industry 
Use of Civilian Airliners as Bombs (9/11) U.S. National Defense Strategy 
Additive Manufacturing (3D Printing) Manufacturing Industry 
 
Just as disruptive threats in the marketplace are often hidden at the bottom of the 
market, vulnerabilities to national security might be found hiding in the institutional 
seams of the interagency. The national focus on maintaining a technological lead and 
employing new advancements as soon as they are ready may not be the best course of 
action to counteract these vulnerabilities.43 Prior to 9/11, the United States was (and still 
is) investing billions of dollars in the F-35 joint strike fighter to combat national security 
threats, while the enemy was buying a commercial airline ticket and conducting an 
operation that inflicted massive damage. Yahyah Ibrahim calls 9/11 “the greatest special 
operation of all time.”44 Considering the cost-benefit analysis of the 9/11 attacks from Al 
Qaeda’s perspective, they clearly possessed an “absolute advantage.” Juan Carlos 
Zarate’s observations illustrate this point; 
In total, the amounts used specifically for the attacks reached only half a 
million dollars—a modest investment for the mass destruction that was to 
follow …. Al Qaeda’s investments would result in the most devastating 
                                                 
43 Leo J. Blanken and Jason J. Lepore, “Slowing Down to Keep the Lead in Military Technology,” in 
Defence and Peace Economics 22 (Taylor & Francis Online, 2010): 317–334. 
44 “F-35 Joint Strike Fighter: Observations on Program Progress,” U.S. GAO, April 14, 2015, accessed 
October 13, 2015, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-15-429T; Yahyah Ibrahim, “The Greatest Special 
Operation of All Time,” Inspire, 2011, Accessed October 8, 2015. 
 11 
terrorist attack on U.S. soil in history. The resulting destruction, economic 
aftermath, and response would cost the United States billions of dollars.45  
Most strategies currently in place focus on strengthening the areas in which the U.S. is 
already leading, but that this is not the effective way forward. 
An organization’s willingness to expand beyond its core competencies can result 
in groundbreaking insights and solutions. In the global marketplace, companies are 
utilizing new collaborative strategies to do just that. Christensen notes that “one of the 
main benefits of [these strategies] is that [they allow] firms to reach beyond their 
organizational boundaries and tap the outside expertise of a broader set of individuals 
than they could otherwise reach.”46 Identifying the vulnerabilities within the seams of the 
interagency (like the unseen, lower-tier threats in the marketplace) through a formal 
collaborative process can result in prevention or delay of a wider population gaining 
access to WMD. 
G. ADDITIVE MANUFACTURING  
We now turn to one potential disruptive innovation that may have grave 
consequences for the global proliferation of WMDs. Wohlers Associates describe 
additive manufacturing in their 2015 report as, “the process of joining materials to make 
objects from three dimensional data, usually layer upon layer, as opposed to subtractive 
manufacturing methodologies.”47 3D printing, a term used interchangeably with additive 
manufacturing, refers to the production of metal, plastic and even biological end-parts 
from a single device driven by an electronic design file to fuse raw material inputs using 
a direct energy source (often a laser).48 Industry will require revolutionary strategies to 
                                                 
45 Juan Carlos Zarate, Treasury’s War: The Unleashing of a New Era of Financial Warfare (New 
York, NY: Public Affairs, 2013). 
46 “Disruptive Innovation,” Christensen Institute. 
47 “What Is Additive Manufacturing.” Informational. Wohlers Associates. Accessed December 10, 
2015. https://www.wohlersassociates.com/additive-manufacturing.html. 
48 Hod Lipson, and Melba Kurman, Fabricated: The New World of 3D Printing (Indianapolis, IN: 
John Wiley & Sons, 2013); Irene J. Petrick, and Timothy W. Simpson, “Point of View: 3D Printing 
Disrupts Manufacturing: How Economies of One Create New Rules of Competition,” Research-
Technology Management: 12–16, 2. 
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match disruptions from additive manufacturing in economies of scale, supply chain 
management and retail manufacturing.49 Rapid prototyping through additive 
manufacturing has already drastically lowered time and costs to achieve breakthroughs in 
biotech development, information technology and materials engineering, just to name a 
few.50 
Additive manufacturing is an emerging technology demonstrating exponential 
growth that is outpacing Moore’s Law, the computing term referring to the observation 
that the number of transistors in an integrated circuit has doubled approximately every 
two years.51 To place this in context, if a 3D-printed toy takes four hours to print today, it 
will take just seven minutes and 30 seconds to print by 2025.52 Government experts like 
Dr. Bruce Goodwin contends that within 5 to 10 years, the advancements in metal 3D 
printing, when combined with high-speed computing, will lower the threshold barrier for 
fabrication of nuclear weapons and enrichment technology available to threat actors.53 
The potential national security threats become evident as one gains understanding of the 
current state of commercial additive manufacturing. 
Further, consider the commercial aspects of additive manufacturing. The U.S. is 
not the leader in this technology—the UK and Germany are, with Asia poised to take 
over this industry in the near future. Singapore, for example, is investing $400 million in 
a five-year advanced manufacturing project focused on 3D printing.54 The Chinese 
government is pledging to invest $245 million over the next seven years to become the 
global additive-manufacturing leader.55 We propose the U.S. re-evaluate its investment in 
                                                 
49 Stephanie S. Shipp, et al., Emerging Global Trends in Advanced Manufacturing (Alexandria, VA: 
Institute for Defense Analysis, 2012). 
50 J.-P Kruth, M.c. Leu, and T. Nakagawa, “Progress in Additive Manufacturing and Rapid 
Prototyping.” CIRP Annals - Manufacturing Technology: 525–40. 
51 R. Hiremane, “From Moore’s Law to Intel Innovation—Prediction to Reality,” Technology 1 
(2005). 
52 Krassenstein, “Moore’s Law of 3D Printing.”  
53 Lucibella, Manufacturing Revolution May Mean Trouble.  
54 Brooke, “China Flexes Muscles.” 
55 Wohler Associates, Wohlers Report 2015. 
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this emerging industry technology to remain economically competitive as well as 
implement appropriations to support the identification of new threats to national defense. 
While additive manufacturing has positive effects on multiple industries in the 
global marketplace (shipping, manufacturing, and medical, to name a few), the potential 
threats to global security cannot be ignored. Actors like North Korea and Iran could 
easily circumvent inspections and bypass international nuclear-weapon-program and 
export controls. Further, sales of complete nuclear weapons programs are not unheard of; 
3D-printing technology could open new global markets for proliferation and completely 
rewrite the script of the world order.56 With the diffusion of additive manufacturing, 
barriers to obtaining WMD would be drastically lowered, not only for states but for proxy 
and non-state entities—those entities for whom ideology sometimes run deeper than 
rational deterrence can reach.57 
H.  WHY INTERAGENCY COLLABORATION? 
Expansive and rapid technological innovation is outpacing the speed at which 
decision makers are able to react to crisis.58 The U.S. government does not currently have 
the agility to effectively address the speed of exponential technological advancements; it 
lacks the capacity and expertise to deeply analyze the diverse range of potential dangers. 
The complexity and scale represented by such a diverse spectrum of WMD threats 
constitutes a “wicked problem,” as no single agency or department in the USG has the 
capacity or understanding to tackle them alone.59 The CWMD problem is compounded in 
                                                 
56 D. Albright and C. Hinderstein, “Unraveling the AQ Khan and Future Proliferation Networks,” 
Washington Quarterly 28, no. 2 (2005): 109–128. 
57 R. Jervis, “Rational Deterrence: Theory and Evidence,” World Politics 41, no. 2 (1989): 183–207; 
N. Gershenfeld, “How to make almost anything,” Foreign Affairs 91, no. 6 (2012): 43–57. 
58 Marc Goodman, “From Crowdsourcing to Crime-Sourcing: The Rise of Distributed Criminality,” 
Big Think, 2011, http://bigthink.com/future-crimes/from-crowdsourcing-to-crime-sourcing-the-rise-of-
distributed-criminality. 
59 Horst W. J. Rittel and Melvin M. Webber, Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning (Berkeley: 
Institute of Urban & Regional Development, University of California, 1972); H. Brenton Milward and 
Joerg Raab, “Dark Networks as Organizational Problems,” 2003, accessed November 10, 2015, 
http://www.hks.harvard.edu/netgov/files/talks/docs/03_06_06_seminar_millward_dark_networks.pdf; J. 
Conklin, Dialogue Mapping: Building Shared Understanding of Wicked Problems (John Wiley & Sons, 
2005); K. Menkhaus, “State Fragility as a Wicked Problem,” PRISM 1, no. 2 (2010), 85–100. 
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the steady state because no single organization is given priority to lead until there is a 
crisis. Collaboration between relatively autonomous USG agencies enables a layering of 
authorities, experience, and institutional knowledge to frame nuanced options to support 
comprehensive action and policy.60  As Brigadier General Terence J. Hilder said, “The 
root issue of interagency woes is the absence of an effective interagency process to drive 
policy integration and synergy within the departments of the Executive Branch.”61 Based 
on the outlined conditions we see a need for enhanced interagency collaboration prior to a 
crisis; therefore, we developed our research statement and narrowed our scope of 
research to counterproliferation efforts in the steady-state. 
I. RESEARCH STATEMENT AND QUESTIONS 
Might a formal collaborative process enhance U.S. counterproliferation (CP) 
efforts? In exploring this, several nested research questions arose: 
1. How can the interagency improve its collaboration?  
2. Do collaboration processes overcome some aspects of organizational 
stove-piping?   
3. What type of collaboration process would be useful to enhance U.S. 
counterproliferation efforts? 
4. How can we measure the results of the collaboration process? 
5. What are the results from the collaboration process? 
6. Can a formal collaboration process change attitudes towards cooperation 
and information sharing. 
7. Can a formal collaboration process introduce opportunities for broader and 
longer-term changes required across the counterproliferation community 
of practice?   
                                                 
60 D. McGregor, “The Human Side of Enterprise,” Reflections 2, no. 1 (1966): 6–15; E. L. Trist, 
“Collaboration in Work Settings: A Personal Perspective,” Journal of Applied Behavioural Sciences 13 
(1983): 268–278; Barbara Gray, Collaborating: Finding Common Ground for Multiparty Problems 
(Jossey-Bass, 1989); Barbara Gray and D. J. Wood, “Collaborative Alliances: Moving from Practice to 
Theory,” Journal of Applied Behavioral Science 27, no. 2 (1991): 3–22; S. Allison, D. Mackie, and D. 
Messick, “Outcome Biases in Social Perception: Implications for Dispositional Inference, Attitude Change, 
Stereotyping, and Social Behavior,” Advances in Experimental Social Psychology 28 (1996): 53–93. 
61 Terence J. Hildner, “Interagency Reform: Changing Organizational Culture through Education and 
Assignment,” Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, March 2007. 
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8. What role does third-party enforcement play in fostering IA collaboration? 
9. Does language matter? Can a process grounded in academic vocabulary 
transcend the broad range of departmental terminologies? 
10. What is the degree of risk posed to WMD proliferation of the growing 
adoption of additive manufacturing capabilities? 
J. SCOPE OF RESEARCH 
This research describes the enhancement of collaboration to better support 
counterproliferation in the “steady state.” Counterproliferation is a subset of countering 
weapons of mass destruction (CWMD) and is an expansive and diverse function, 
spanning the elements of U.S. national power—diplomatic, information, military, 
economic, financial, intelligence, and law enforcement (DIMEFIL)—and it permeates 
through the entire IA. IA efforts to coordinate, cooperate, and collaborate to counter the 
proliferation of WMD materials and technologies reside largely in the steady state. 
“Steady state” refers to a system in equilibrium. It is a widely used term in economics, 
electrical engineering, chemistry, physics, government, medicine, and many other fields 
to indicate a stable condition that remains “constant over time, but that constant state 
requires continual work.”62 With respect to the scope of counterproliferation, we have 
limited our spectrum of study to the steady state, rather than crisis response, which has 
received considerably more attention.63  
Instead of examining current or past proliferation technologies with associated 
U.S. policy, we elected to examine additive manufacturing as a disruptive innovation that 
may lower the barrier for entry for restricted nuclear technology and materials. This 
technology has the potential to increase the speed of proliferation by networking 
communities of expertise together. In online open-source communities, groups of experts 
can convene discussions with relative anonymity. Cryptocurrencies can be used to 
transfer funds between organizations online, challenging threat finance and enforcement 
agency efforts to track large sums of money used by proliferation networks and 
                                                 
62 Jason Steele, “Steady-state Vs. Equilibrium in Biology,” SeattlePi, 2015, 
http://education.seattlepi.com/steady-state-vs-equilibrium-biology-6085.html. 
63 A. J. Ryan, “Interagency Collaboration by Design,” InterAgency Journal 3, no. 3 (2012): 21–30. 
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transnational criminal organizations (TCO).64 Do-it-yourself biologists can conduct 
unrestricted experiments. Developments in additive manufacturing move forward at a 
pace where the government security apparatus cannot maintain awareness; given 
Goodwin’s prediction regarding 3D printed WMDs within a decade, U.S. adversaries 
may soon have the ability to print a nuclear weapon.65 Additive manufacturing 
technologies will increasingly challenge export-control policies and make it difficult for 
counterproliferation professionals to track WMD supply-chain patterns.  
Our research analyzes how the interagency may collaborate to dissuade, deter, 
deny, disrupt, degrade, or defeat an adversary of the United States who plans to acquire 
and use WMD.66 More specifically, we operationalize the term “collaboration” by 
arguing that there are three necessary dimensions to the concept: transparency, resource 
sharing, and interdependence. We then explore the use of a formal collaborative process 
to facilitate collaboration among two or more USG organizations. Similarly, we develop 
and assess the impact of venue upon the degree of collaboration observed. We tentatively 
support our claim with field exercises that show how a formal collaboration process can 
enhance steady-state counterproliferation efforts through increased transparency, resource 
sharing, and organizational interdependence. 
K. OUTLINE OF PROJECT 
The document proceeds as follows. We begin with a review of the sizable 
literature that seeks to explain collaboration. This work spans the disciplines of 
organizational theory, managerial economics, as well as political science.  
                                                 
64 Howard Altman, “SOCOM Tracking Money That Funds Violent Extremists,” TBO-The Tampa 
Tribune, March 29, 2015, http://www.tbo.com/list/military-news/altman/socom-tracking-money-that-funds-
violent-extremists-20150329/. 
65 Michael Lucibella, “Manufacturing Revolution May Mean Trouble for National Security,” APS 
News, March 2015, http://www.aps.org/publications/apsnews/201504/revolution.cfm. 
66 Collaboration differs from cooperation, which is defined as “agreed resource exchange,” which is 
not necessarily reciprocal or directed toward a common goal (Thomson and Perry, 2006). Coordination is a 
deconfliction of the use of time and space. Collaboration, cooperation, and coordination are all necessary in 
interagency partnerships. 
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Then, we formulate arguments as to how IA collaboration can be improved using 
business models and techniques. More specifically, we draw from best business practices 
of high tech industry; the “integrated product teams” within these companies draw 
together disparate divisions across the firm to work on a common problem. We mimic 
this approach by utilizing a custom-built formal collaborative process called Opportunity 
Analysis (OA). Further, we make arguments concerning the venue in which collaboration 
is attempted.  
We then describe and analyze the results of a field exercise conducted at the U.S. 
embassy in Singapore. Initial outcomes are measured through the collection of qualitative 
data gleaned from participant responses to ascertain whether the dimensions in our model 
increased or decreased due to the formal OA process.  Further analysis of participant’s 
ongoing processes and interactions produced evidence of whether the existing 
collaboration, regularly conducted by the CPWG, was enhanced or not.67   
Drawing from the conclusions of our research, we make recommendations for 
expanding awareness of the counterproliferation mission space, including ways DOD can 
serve in a number of supporting roles to IA partners.68 Several examples of such 
recommendations are: 
• Concerted efforts are required to find and utilize a common vocabulary 
among interagency participants. 
• There exists a need for increased outreach to the interagency 
counterproliferation community of practice. 
• A virtual collaboration space for the counterproliferation community that 
exists on a single platform to permeate the variety of classified and 
unclassified networks.   
• Institutionalization of a formal collaborative process across the U.S. 
Interagency. 
                                                 
67 Department of State, “Embassy Singapore Finds Value in Use of Interagency Opportunity Analysis 
to Tackle Complex Issue,” cable, September 23, 2015. 
68 In doing so, we seek to directly support the 2015 SOCOM CDR guidance to expand awareness of 
CWMD functions across the IA to better determine how, collectively, mission enablers can be applied to 
defeat the nation’s adversaries. 
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Nuclear weapons pose an existential threat to the United States. Improved 
collaboration reveals opportunities to identify threats posed by disruptive innovations. 
Improvements to transparency, interdependence, and resource sharing mitigate 
vulnerabilities across institutional seams. The cost of unimproved collaboration, 
accepting the way we currently do business in the IA, could be catastrophic.  We now 
turn to the concept of “collaboration,” defining it, examining theories of collaboration, 




II. EXISTING LITERATURE ON COLLABORATION 
There are copious writings regarding inter-organizational behavior in the private 
and public sectors that provide the foundation for our exploration of interagency 
collaboration. First, we set out to define collaboration as it pertains to our effort. We then 
distill the literature and separate it into two veins that best capture the dynamics under 
study here: the impact of lack of information and the impact of divergent interests. The 
first approach explores the role of information in allowing increased collaboration when 
distributional conflicts are absent. The second approach examines bureaucratic politics 
and theories of organizational culture that focus on divergence of actor preferences and 
how the resulting competition may inhibit effective interagency collaboration. The 
combination of these theoretical approaches provides a more complete picture of 
foundational challenges to collaboration. We then operationalize the concept by focusing 
on three primary dimensions of collaboration: transparency, resource sharing, and 
interdependence. 
A. DEFINING COLLABORATION 
There are many definitions of collaboration to be found within the broad literature 
on the subject. Barbara Gray offers her definition as, “Collaboration is a process through 
which parties who see different aspects of a problem can constructively explore their 
differences and search for solutions that go beyond their own limited vision of what is 
possible.”69 Reflecting on the need to collaborate in order to overcome wicked problems, 
Denning states, “Collaboration is a synergistic coordination in which the collaborators 
create new [observations], new possibilities, new futures, and new concerns.”70 We find 
Lindon’s definition for collaboration the most useful basis for our analysis: “when people 
from different organizations (or units within one organization) produce something 
                                                 
69 Gray, Collaborating: Finding Common Ground.  5. 
70 Peter Denning. “Resolving Wicked Problems through Collaboration.” In Handbook of Research on 
Socio-technical Design and Social Networking Systems, edited by Brian Whitworth and Aldo De Moor. 
Vol. 2.( Hershey, NY: Information Science Reference, 2009), 721. 
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together through joint effort, resources, and decision making, and share ownership of the 
final product or service.”71 Stemming from this definition, we focus on three dimensions 
of collaboration: transparency, resource sharing and interdependent action. In other 
words, what become important are actors creating a “collaborative advantage” to 
overcome vulnerabilities from a lack of transparency, resource sharing and 
interdependent actions.72   
There are many ways to describe the foundations of how and why individuals and 
groups choose to collaborate. We developed our core approach through the lens of 
microeconomics. The first component that emerges within this approach is the 
importance of information.73 Uncertainty from a lack of information can serve to create 
friction between groups, even when a common goal is desired. The second component is 
incentives; the impact on actor behavior which stems from the relative distribution of 
material resources amongst the actors.74 We now examine each of these two factors in 
turn before building a rigorous operationalization of the concept. 
B. THE ROLE OF INFORMATION 
The “lack of information” approach can be conceptualized as a coordination 
problem. Rational actor models are based on the notion of actors being in a stable 
equilibrium in which no actor has a unilateral incentive to defect (change strategies).75 
Given that games can have multiple equilibria, there may be conditions under which a 
‘Pareto superior’ outcome becomes attainable—defined as one in which every actor 
would experience absolute gains.76 In such conditions, transparency among actors could 
                                                 
71 Russell M. Lindon, Working Across Boundaries, San Francisco, CA: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 
(2002), 7. 
72 Chris Huxham, Creating Collaborative Advantage (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1996). 
73 Anthony Downs, Inside Bureaucracy (Little, Brown, and Co., 1967), 9–10. 
74 David Kreps, Microeconomic Foundations I: Choice and Competitive Markets (Trenton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 2012). 
75 See the attributes of the Nash equilibrium concept in Robert Gibbons, An Introduction to Applicable 
Game Theory (Princeton University Press, 2007). 
76 Powell, “Absolute and Relative Gains.” 
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allow them to coordinate on the new, superior outcome, with no distributional gains 
issues. The question then is what inhibits the appropriate level of information sharing? 
We can conceive of this conscious limiting of information flows as strategic 
games that actors play against rivals, as well as their political overseers.77 This may 
include such information as how much budget is needed to accomplish tasks, how well it 
is performing, and what issues it is suited to tackle. Because of these dynamics, actors 
often fail to share the types of information amongst themselves that would allow for joint 
gains from collaboration. The “message distortion problem,” for example, makes 
transparency a critical issue and a challenge to collaboration.78 Leaders must wade 
through vast amounts of information to identify what is accurate and relevant for 
decision-making, but the act of sharing information through collaboration with adjacent 
agencies is impaired by limited visibility of information within individual organizations. 
Compounding this, the nature of bureaucracies is to limit external communications out of 
fear of exposing poor internal behavior, failures, or the true costs for the organization to 
execute its mission.79 Information flow and unfettered communication, therefore, present 
a fundamental challenge to collaboration among such entities.  
In response to these challenges, a range of trust-based literature informs our 
approach to information sharing.80 Trust may evolve from interactions between two or 
more parties where transaction costs and reputation are critical in determining levels of 
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1 (1993): 453–486. 
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collaboration.81 In organizational trust relationships, strategic alliances—where actors 
cooperate rather than acting opportunistically—form to pursue mutually beneficial 
goals.82 Unlike personal relationships, inter- and intra-organizational relationships can 
presume trust; category-based trust, which is grounded on a trustee’s membership in an 
organization, facilitates this.83 Role-based trust, also presumptive, is based on an 
individual’s role in an organization.84 These forms of trust provide insight into 
interagency efforts to collaborate across the shared counterproliferation mission space. 
There are indications of informal trust networks among hierarchical organizations where 
key stakeholders find value in collaborative relationships.85 We utilize the insights from 
this literature in the shaping of our arguments in the next sections. 
C. THE ROLE OF INTERESTS 
The “divergent interests” approach examines conditions where, even if complete 
information is achieved, competing interests may hinder collaboration among actors. This 
is known as distributional conflict.86 The likelihood of competing interests and skill sets 
has the potential to foster competition rather than collaboration, which may be beneficial, 
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depending on the nature of the issue.87 The two main factors that lead to such 
competition are bureaucratic politics and differences in organizational cultures.  
The “bureaucratic politics” literature focuses on the inherent nature of 
bureaucratic entities to compete over budgets, authorities, and relative prestige.88 Simply 
stated, interagency organizations in the steady state may have nothing to gain by 
cooperating.89 The result is a lack of motivation to collaborate unless the forcing function 
of an exogenous event, such as a crisis, is introduced.90 Anthony Down’s seminal work 
on these organizations identifies the fundamental characteristics of bureaucratic behavior 
and how these traits create challenges for the nimble interagency collaboration necessary 
to counter novel emerging threats.91 More specifically, mature interagency institutions 
naturally exhibit inertia; leaders within these organizations have been acculturated and 
incentivized to both adhere to the entities’ original missions and view the environment 
through the organizations’ value structures. Such linear thinking creates independent 
organizations that are not incentivized to creep outside their respective “lanes.” These 
lanes promote priorities for each agency, which then receive the greatest allocations from 
budgets, resources, and individual efforts.  
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A new issue that represents a potential threat but does not fall within any agency’s 
priorities rests in the seams between agency lanes.92 Beyond the simple “quest for 
increased budget” story often emphasized by the bureaucratic politics literature, the study 
of organizational culture, conversely, examines intrinsic and extrinsic reasons for 
distributional conflict between actors.93 The competing values framework outlines how 
organizational cultures develop based on internal and external factors.94 Internal need for 
control, in contrast with decentralization of authority, breeds differences in how 
individuals within the organization interact. Driven by external requirements, 
organizations differ on the value of unconstrained creativity versus durability and 
accountability.95 Cultural differences serve to exacerbate distributional conflict by 
increasing the perceived relative-gains dilemma while simultaneously reducing effective 
communication between actors. Differences in lexicon can complicate even simple 
communication between interagency partners, and having been socialized within 
individual agencies, organizations may view one another as rivals due to differing visions 
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of strategy and policy based on cultural norms and perceived competition.96 These 
factors can make interagency collaboration tricky at best. 
Clashing interests create the largest barrier to collaboration amongst IA partners. 
As we will explore below, some of aspects of divergent incentives may be beyond the 
scope of our analysis to remedy (for example, competition over budget). Some impacts of 
divergence may be malleable, however, within the scope of our analysis. For example, 
the cultural driver of divergent interests may be ameliorated through the process of 
collaboration that is chosen, as well as within the venue that is selected. Further, 
including actors from multiple levels of authority may assist in reducing the real – or 
perceived – differences of interest that may exist amongst bureaucratic entities.    
D. OPERATIONALIZATION OF COLLABORATION 
To operationalize collaboration for this study we identified three dimensions with 
measurable indicators. These dimensions are transparency, resource sharing and 
interdependence.97 We argue that each is a necessary condition for true collaboration, and 
we build a rigorous operationalization of the concept to discipline our coding of 
collaborative efforts (see Appendix A).   
The first dimension of collaboration is transparency. Increased transparency can 
serve to overcome issues that arise from a lack of information and leads to increased trust 
between actors. The interagency can be described as a system of what Litterer would 
define as “task or work groups” where bounded rationality inhibits communication and 
information sharing, but “relationships and processes are key.”98 Increased willingness to 
96 Maryan Rodriques, Effective Business Communication (Concept Publishing Company, 2003); E. 
Lank, Collaborative Advantage: How Organizations Win By Working Together (Palgrave Macmillan, 
2006); 
S. K. Mandal, Effective Communication & Public Speaking (Jaico Publishing House, 2006). 
97 Stephen G. Haines, System Thinking & Learning, Amherst, MA: HRD Press (2000); Peter M. 
Senge. The Fifth Discipline: The Art and Practice of the Learning Organization. New York, N.Y.: 
Doubleday/Currency, 1990. 
98 Joseph A. Litterer, The Analysis of Organizations, New York, N.Y.: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. (1973) 
52, 233–235; Herbert Simon, “Rational Decision Making in Business Organizations.” (Nobel Memorial 
Lecture), American Economic Review 69, no. 4 (1979): 493–513; Haines, System Thinking & Learning, 31. 
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share information, veracity of information and the speed it is delivered increases 
transparency and shared knowledge between groups.99 Therefore, increased transparency 
is something that should be observed in collaboration  
The second dimension of collaboration is resource sharing. Edith Penrose’s 
contribution to the resource-based view of strategic management provides greater 
understanding of the inherent challenges to inter-organizational sharing of resources.100 
Component distinctions are made between services, physical assets, time, and human 
capital within the model. Each organization’s goal of creating and/or maintaining a 
competitive advantage through firm-specific isolating mechanisms can be beneficial to 
gaining dominance within the private sector, but present challenges to efficient 
collaboration in nonprofit, public sector engagements.101 The prioritization of resources 
is dependent on desired outcomes. Therefore, when organizations contribute precious 
resources to a joint effort, this is an instantiation of collaboration.  
The third dimension of collaboration is interdependence. This refers to the degree 
to which an organization is willing to stake its fortunes or reputation to a joint decision, 
effort, or outcome. In other words, it is the degree of risk an organization is willing to 
assume in order to attain desired collaborative outcomes.102 When organizations are 
willing to tie their bureaucratic fortunes to outcomes that are the result of joint effort, 
then, we argue, collaboration is being observed. 
99 Karl E Weick., and Karlene H. Roberts, “Collective Mind in Organizations: Heedful Interrelating on 
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E. CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this literature review is to utilize insights from the relevant bodies 
of work to examine methods and environments that can optimize networks, 
organizational structures, and inter-organization collaboration in support of the CWMD 
mission in the steady state. This requires identifying processes that promote cooperation 
and laying out the costs and benefits of each.103 Drawing from existing processes that 
seek to gain collaborative solutions, we utilize a formal process to overcome the steady-
state gap in collaboration that exists when there is no emergent crisis.104 Further 
examination of current interagency frameworks supports identifying extant environments 
where a collaboration model could be immediately useful.105 The following section 
explores insights from the private sector regarding collaboration to formulate some 
insights as to how the use of a formal collaborative process and the venue in which the 
process is utilized may lead to the enhancement of collaborative outcomes.  
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III. LESSONS GLEANED FROM THE MARKETPLACE ABOUT 
THE UTILITY OF A FORMAL COLLABORATIVE PROCESS 
An organization’s ability to learn, and translate that learning into action 
rapidly, is the ultimate competitive advantage. 
—Jack Welch106 
 
A. INSIGHTS FROM THE PRIVATE SECTOR 
We borrow from emerging business models to identify how firms overcome 
collaboration challenges. The use of private-sector models to analyze bureaucracies is an 
emerging mode of inquiry that provides crucial insights. As observed by Alexander 
Cooley, “both economic firms and political hierarchies are forms of complex social 
organization that, when organized, administered, or delegated according to similar logics, 
will face common problems and challenges … by applying [a] firm-type model to 
political settings, one can better understand how individual administrators, regardless of 
their exact functions … will behave.”107 Therefore, to meet the challenge of scoping the 
complex problem of collaborative interagency responses to counterproliferation into a 
manageable system for analysis, we have applied some tools from microeconomics.108 
More specifically, the emerging field of organizational economics has been tailored to fit 
the needs of this problem set. As Robert Gibbons notes, “Economic models that take their 
underlying assumptions seriously must deliver a post-Weberian view of organizations: 
rule violations, unimplemented decisions, subverted inspections, parochial interests, and 
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undermined missions will be persistent problems, not exceptions.”109 These are the 
precise aspects of bureaucratic organizations put under the microscope here. 
Meeting the current counterproliferation challenge relies on disparate, specialized, 
well-meaning actors working in parallel toward a common goal.110 The result, however, 
is an exponential number of complicated scenarios and outcomes dependent on any 
number of actors who may or may not collaborate. Regularly, actors work apart and 
without knowledge of complementary or parallel efforts.111 At other times, competition 
creates friction when agencies attempt to obtain relative gains, to the detriment of the 
common goal.112 The complex nature of business can be described in the same fashion. 
Inside large organizations, departments work individually due to the efficacy of discipline 
specialization.113 To overcome structural faults within the company, managers may 
implement policies that drive individual departments to work together toward a common 
goal.114 We have used these private-sector insights from the “lean thinking” management 
approach to better understand the complexity of emerging WMD threats.115 More 
specifically, thinking of collaborators as integrated teams, and conceiving of the 
collaboration process as a series of “inputs” and “outputs” sets the stage for the use of the 
formal collaborative process. 
The chapter proceeds as follows. We utilize insights from the private sector to 
reconsider the “inputs” and “outputs” of the counterproliferation effort. We then 
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introduce “Opportunity Analysis” as a formal process that seeks to enhance collaboration. 
We then explore the impact of venue on collaboration: how environmental factors may 
influence the degree of collaboration observed. Finally, we lay out a research design that 
will allow us to empirically assess the arguments we have generated in this chapter.     
B. THE UTILITY OF INTEGRATED TEAMS 
One strategy for overcoming the challenges of multidiscipline teams comes from 
companies developing new integrated technology.116 High-technology markets often 
employ integrated product teams (IPTs) to collaborate to identify root causes or potential 
failures before, during, and after systems are designed.117 IPTs can resemble 
multidisciplinary integrated IA counterproliferation working groups so the analysis of 
IPTs is relevant to the development of IA collaboration strategies. IPTs include 
engineers, marketers, financial managers, accountants, designers, and manufacturers 
(among others) to lower overall costs by reducing friction and mitigating potential 
failure. Such teams facilitate communication, the oversight of partner requirements, and 
locate waste from identical cost drivers. IPTs incorporate and share lessons learned to 
raise awareness of existing and parallel efforts within the company. The net effect is 
increased consideration of complementary requirements, bolstered communication, and 
cooperation to effectively reduce the time and cost to find solutions to complex issues.118 
Understanding how IPT’s improve collaboration assists in analyzing interagency 
challenges posed by bureaucratic politics, a lack of information, or competing 
organizational cultures. 
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C. RECONSTRUING THE “INPUTS/OUTPUTS” OF COLLABORATION 
Drawing from best business practices of defense acquisition and the use of IPTs, 
we reconceive the process of collaboration (see Figure 2) to analyze the flow of 
counterproliferation missions within the IA system to identify where decision-making 
and problem-solving capabilities can be improved within a business context.119 The value 
of this model is in characterizing the counterproliferation mission space in a novel 
manner that is appropriately simplified and scoped for interagency collaborative 
response.  
A common approach to characterizing the flow of an organization’s mission to 
seek improvement is the SIPOC model (Figure 2).120 The method simplifies a complex 
system into a directional flow of basic steps to support analysis.121 This “chunking” 
technique breaks down any system into five distinct parts: Suppliers, Inputs, Process, 
Outputs, and Customers (SIPOC). To demonstrate this concept relevant to the 
interagency, we have developed the Interagency CP Collaboration Concept Model 
(Figure 2). The model scopes what areas can be identified and addressed to improve 
outcomes. Importantly, it also identifies what areas are “out of scope” and potential 
aspects of the problem that are related and may need to be addressed at a later date. 
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Figure 2.  Interagency CP Collaboration Concept Model 
 
Adapted from Uday Apte, “Ops Management/LSS DMAIC Methodology” (lecture, 
Naval Post Graduate School, Monterey, CA, September 3, 2015).  
For our application to the counterproliferation system, the suppliers are the 
numerous and distinct agencies who contribute to U.S. counterproliferation efforts. The 
distinct mission enablers and specialties each agency contributes to the 
counterproliferation mission set are the inputs. When two or more agencies come 
together to identify how these inputs can be blended, this interagency collaboration is the 
process. The outputs of this process can be defined as military, political, law 
enforcement, intelligence, or other actions and policies that effect counterproliferation 
policy. Finally, the customer is those agencies carrying out actions or who may be 
affected, including but not limited to the executing agent or organization, the executives 
charged with accountability of the mission, and even the American public.   
To overcome the gaps between agency lanes, collaboration allows agencies to 
address vulnerabilities through increased transparency, sharing of resources, and 
interdependent actions. With the emerging disruptive-technology challenge of upstream 
counterproliferation, coupled with its misalignment with traditional USG bureaucratic 
structures, interagency collaboration in the steady state is a crucial area of concern. The 
synthesis of relevant business literature has now set the stage for the introduction of a 
formal collaborative process as a response to the evolving proliferation threat.     
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D. INTRODUCING A FORMAL PROCESS: OPPORTUNITY ANALYSIS 
Ad hoc collaboration, the present norm in the IA, suffers from limitations without 
the forcing function of crisis. There are instances of productive ad hoc interagency 
collaboration; however, these efforts are difficult to reproduce or sustain.122 An effective 
collaboration process can overcome some aspects of organizational stove-piping. It can 
change attitudes toward cooperation and information sharing and introduce opportunities 
for the broader changes required across the counterproliferation community of practice. 
We seek to assess the impact of one such process here. Opportunity Analysis (OA) is a 
formal collaboration process that divides and analyzes complicated problems. It allows an 
interdisciplinary and multi-organizational team to analyze a problem set using 
unconstrained thinking, dialogue, and collaborative software. The process breaks down 
large, ‘wicked’ problems into digestible pieces. OA uses common language, 
predominately academic, to replace organization-specific jargon. It enables a diverse 
group to organize, communicate and operate in order to discover opportunities. These 
opportunities could be missed when relying on ad hoc collaboration alone.123 
OA is grounded in the U.S. special operations pathway defeat (SOPD) 
methodology that was developed for planning the upstream defeat of WMD. This method 
accounts for the equities of each department or agency in the shared counterproliferation 
mission space. OA goes farther than SOPD by framing alternative futures and 
discovering opportunities to enable or prevent those futures. OA uses an alternative-
futures pathway analysis with a nodal dissection technique to divide and analyze a 
problem. Through the OA process a team focuses on one alternative future at a time and 
looks for opportunities to create pathways for action. The nodal dissection technique 
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examples in Figures 3 and 4 illustrate how OA divides up the problem for a systematic 
analysis of each future and pathway.124 
Figure 3.  OA Nodal Dissection Technique Macro (Example) 
124 It is important to note that the terms included in Figures 3 and 4 are notional and tailored to the 
specifics of one field study. The attributes listed in Figure 4 (RICCAAAPP) were designed for USG 
interagency entities, but are flexible to other organizational frameworks as needed in future studies. 
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Figure 4.  OA Nodal Dissection Technique Micro (Example) 
The OA process enables enhanced collaboration between the participants by 
bringing a separate and distinctive approach to the application of the categories of 
RICCAAAPP. Each organization’s RICCAAAPP (pronounced “recap”) components, 
collectively known as Mission Enablers, are compared alongside other organizations’ 
enablers to identify collaborative opportunities to more effectively approach a complex 
problem: 
• Responsibility: Having the specific charge to execute a particular action.
• Influence: Ability to effect action through a third party to accomplish one
or more of the above elements or to act independently to accomplish
CWMD objectives.
• Capability: The explicit abilities of regional and global resources with
CWMD-specific technical capabilities, training, equipment, and readiness.
• Capacity: The depth and sustainability of regional and global resources to
provide a specific capability to support CWMD operations for the required
time or cycles of operations.
• Awareness. Cognizance of an issue or opportunity, combined with the
speed and agility to move the information required to coordinate and
e
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collaborate across an array of interagency, regional, or global partners to 
enable rapid planning and engagement. 
• Authority: The existence of legal authorities to carry out the required 
actions. 
• Access: Physical access to the point of action. 
• Placement: Ability to achieve access through organizational position or 
nontraditional means.  
• Policy: Department, national or international strategies, guidelines, or 
norms that enable, or at least justify, a CWMD action, including treaties, 
agreements, regimes, and the like.125 
In sum, OA parses out complex challenges in a manner tailored to the range of IA 
partners. By methodically taking into account the relevant attributes of the contributors, 
and matching them against the relevant aspects of the problem, it is reasonable to expect 
a significant increase in collaboration. Further, the nature of the process itself is designed 
to increase the flow of information, as well as to erode cultural barriers among 
participants—providing additional potential mechanisms toward increased collaboration.  
E. THE IMPACT OF VENUE 
Beyond the absence or presence of a formal collaboration process, we develop 
further arguments regarding the venue in which such efforts take place. In October of 
2014, the OA methodology helped a cross-functional IA team in the NCR develop a 
strategy in support of U.S. CENTCOM. Based on our observations, develop explored the 
limiting conditions of the given venue. Would it be possible to enhance the effects of the 
formal process by altering the venue in three ways?  
First, the participants in the NCR were physically close to their bureaucratic 
headquarters. It may be the case that the culture and pressures of their home organization 
could create a formidable challenge to collaboration, whereas physical distance from the 
NCR might lessen the effect. Secondly, the participants in the NCR OA exercise had no 
higher authority to facilitate, let alone enforce, collaborative policies. Perhaps a venue 
                                                 
125 Scott et al., Opportunity Analysis for U.S. Embassy Singapore. 
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with an entity possessing some attributes of a third-party enforcer would allow for more 
profound levels of collaboration.  
Finally, the participants of the NCR exercise did not know one another personally. 
Pre-existing personal relationships might similarly result in higher levels of collaboration. 
Based on these ruminations, the notion of an embassy team emerged as a venue to 
explore these arguments. The teams in embassies exist far from their organizations’ 
headquarters, they exist under the authority of the ambassador, and they work in close 
proximity to one another for extended periods in close quarters. Some trade-offs, 
however, stemming from venue selection may be expected. For example, the dedication 
of organization resources to a common effort may be controlled above the level authority 
to be found in an embassy; the same may go for locking an organization’s reputation to a 
joint decision. Therefore, we may expect the transparency dimension of collaboration to 
increase more sharply in an embassy venue, than the resource sharing or interdependence 
dimensions. 
F. RESEARCH DESIGN 
To explore these arguments regarding the use of formal collaborative processes 
and the venue of collaboration, we conduct an exploratory field study. Such field studies 
provide both limited deductive and inductive insights. In such studies “variables co-vary 
as expected but at are at extremely high or low values [that] may help uncover causal 
mechanisms. Such cases may not allow [strong] inferences to wider populations … but 
limited inferences might be possible if causal mechanisms are identified.”126 This fits the 
needs of the current study for a number of reasons. First, hypothesizing that the use of a 
formal process would increase collaboration among an inter-agency working group is 
intuitive. The potential interactive effects that such a process may produce in an already 
high-performing embassy team, however, might be significantly higher. The purpose, 
then, beyond recording the increase in collaboration (the causal “effect” of the study), 
will be to search for the pathways by which such a set of conditions produces such 
                                                 
126 Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, 2005, Case Studies and Theory Development in the 
Social Sciences (Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press), 75. 
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increased collaboration (the causal “mechanisms” of the study). Further, such 
mechanisms may emerge in unexpected ways, and the exploratory field study allows for 
such inductive results. Though inferences and generalizability from such a study may be 
limited, its results provide the springboard for further studies and tool refinement.  
An embassy-level exercise was designed to fulfill the needs of the exploratory 
field study, as the application of the OA process to the embassy’s pre-existing team of IA 
actors would allow for the methodology to operate. Though observing higher levels of 
collaboration is intuitive in this case, causal mechanisms might be uncovered, interaction 
effects might be revealed, and future research questions developed. To execute the study, 
we first sought to establish a “baseline” expected value of collaboration, grounded in the 
results of the CENTCOM exercise. We then developed a plan of qualitative data 
gathering, to include an extensive set of interview questions (see Appendix B) to match 
our operationalization of collaboration established above (see Appendix A).  
G. CONCLUSIONS 
In sum, we hypothesize that the introduction of a formal process and the careful 
selection of venue serve to increase IA collaboration. A field study to explore these 
arguments was planned and conducted at the U.S. embassy in Singapore using OA as the 
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IV. EXPLORATORY FIELD STUDY: INTERAGENCY 
OPPORTUNITY ANALYSIS 
We can’t control everything, but we can control how we organize, 
communicate, and operate. 
—Dr. John Arquilla127 
 
Based on the arguments developed over the previous chapters, we now proceed to 
an assessment. Through an exploratory field study, we now analyze the degree to which a 
formal process, as well as venue selection, might improve collaboration among 
interagency actors. The following summarizes our analysis of the formal OA 
collaborative process applied to counterproliferation efforts in a U.S. embassy. 
Within regard to venue selection, we sought a country team willing to perform a 
table top exercise (TTX) to determine if OA improved collaborative outcomes. Through 
coordination with Special Operations Command Pacific (SOCPAC), we identified the 
U.S. Embassy to Singapore. The Singapore counterproliferation working group (CPWG) 
routinely works regional counterproliferation issues and determined that OA could 
potentially enhance their efforts.128 The CPWG closely resembles an industry integrated 
product team (IPT), where multidiscipline members collaborate regularly to tackle 
complex real-world problems. Each member possesses a unique culture, lexicon, mission, 
and internal processes. Each CPWG member represents the suppliers within the 
counterproliferation process. All members would bring specific mission enablers, or 
inputs, into a collaboration process. The outputs, or options, can then be counted and 
measured for improvement, either quantitatively or qualitatively. Using the ambassador 
as the customer, we can then measure how well these outcomes are received.  
                                                 
127 Arquilla, conversation with authors. 
128 The U.S. Embassy to Singapore’s CPWG has regional responsibilities in Southeast Asia and at 
times brings participants into the working group from other embassies. For this TTX, the CPWG gained 
participants from Washington, DC, to inform the members on policy and global concerns. It consisted of 
DOS, FBI, DOE, DHS-HIS, DTRA, DOD (Defense Attaché and SOCPAC). Not present at the TTX but 
members of the CPWG were RA and Treasury.  
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We partnered with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, 
Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs (OASD-NCB), Office of the Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Threat Reduction and Arms Control (ODASD-
TRAC), CWMD Systems portfolio to develop a TTX designed to measure gains in 
steady-state collaboration between the CPWG’s regular ad hoc processes and the formal 
OA collaborative process identified in the Interagency CP Collaboration Concept Model. 
To draw interest and drive collaboration, we developed a scenario using additive 
manufacturing, the disruptive technology described above, to ascertain its implications 
for WMD proliferation. A fictional, yet plausible, scenario was developed in which the 
government of Singapore is unaware of a North Korean proliferation network that is 3D 
printing nuclear fuel-cycle components inside Singapore. Such a development would 
enable North Korea’s nuclear weapons program to circumvent and potentially defeat 
current means of indication and warning; sanctions, watch lists, and export-control 
enforcement would be rendered obsolete.129 The U.S. Embassy to Singapore allowed the 
CPWG to support our efforts.130 We facilitated the TTX over a five-day period, with the 
CPWG producing options as a result of the formal collaborative process. At the 
conclusion of the TTX, we briefed the outcomes directly to the ambassador and his 
executive team specific to the TTX scenario.  
This chapter proceeds as follows. First, we describe the TTX and summarize its 
results to demonstrate the broad, whole-of-government approach derived through the OA 
collaborative effort. Next, we focus on the degree of collaboration fostered during the 
exercise. More specifically, we walk through the impacts the formal process had on three 
dimensions of collaboration, as realized by observations of impact on levels of 
transparency, resource provision, and interdependence among the participants. We then 
conclude the chapter by highlighting dynamics of collaboration that emerged through the 
                                                 
129 An information support package (ISP) was developed for this exercise, containing expert analysis 
of trends in government, industry, and academia to characterize what is currently achievable with AM in 
relation to WMD development and to define potential trajectories of the future as AM capabilities and 
expertise mature and become more prevalent. It was clear that the possibility of DPRK and other 
adversaries applying AM to development of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons development exists. 
130 The exercise was facilitated and supported by OASD (NCB), NPS, DTRA, SOCPAC, and 
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.  
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exercise itself. These new insights provide refinement to our arguments, and may serve as 
the basis for future research on collaboration.  
A. ACTIONABLE SOLUTIONS SPECIFIC TO THE SCENARIO  
The NPS and ODASD team were invited to brief the Honorable Kirk Wagar, U.S. 
ambassador to Singapore, on the initial outcomes of the CPWG’s efforts and 
counterproliferation TTX. Through OA, the CPWG developed 169 distinct options to 
shape steady state approaches to nefarious aspects of additive manufacturing. These 
themes combine as the basis of a strategy for the country team. Taken from the DOS 
cable, written in response to the TTX, Ambassador Wagar stated: 
The clear conclusion is that when it comes to steady-state 
counterproliferation engagement, whether it be additive manufacturing, 
WMD, or an over-the-horizon threat, in a whole-of-government approach, 
diplomatic, intelligence, and law enforcement agencies are well positioned 
to actively engage in a wide variety of efforts, with DOD playing a 
supporting—albeit important—role. Understanding this dynamic holds 
potential to greatly enhance strategic planning across integrated country 
and national strategies and the optimal sequencing and deployment of 
USG resources.131 
The 169 options were first organized into the elements of national power 
(DIMEFIL) with the intent of demonstrating which organization might be responsible for 
taking lead for collaborative actions. Through this particular organization of efforts, we 
identified that only 8% were military led options. Of the options, 34% were diplomatic in 
nature, 8% were information or strategic communication options, 6% were economic 
options that fell outside of law enforcement, only 6% centered on finance efforts,132 18% 
fell under intelligence requirements,133 and 21% would be led by law enforcement. The 
ambassador viewed many of these options as falling within the context of political 
                                                 
131 Department of State, “Embassy Singapore Finds Value in Use of Interagency Opportunity Analysis 
to Tackle Complex Issue,” cable, September 23, 2015.  
132 The Treasury officer was not able to participate. If he had been, there may have been a greater 
number of financial options, changing the resulting percentages. 
133 No representatives from the Director of National Intelligence participated in the TTX. If a 
representative had been present, there may have been a greater number of intelligence options, changing the 
resulting percentages. 
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decision-making noting, “Sixty percent had a diplomatic component (either traditional 
diplomacy or an intelligence/information sharing component) and 21% focused on the 
role of law enforcement.”134 This distribution is noteworthy, as the makeup of the 
participating group was comprised of over 20% military members and yet the outcome 
clearly denotes Defense as a minority agency to take lead in steady state options – the 
direct point articulated by the USSOCOM Commander.135 
Once lead agencies are determined through initial binning into DIMEFIL, we 
categorize the range of options into six activity themes. The six activity themes coalesce 
into a strategy to deal with over-the-horizon threats posed by additive manufacturing. 
Many of the options produced by the CPWG have application to more than one of the 
themes, creating interdependencies across the interagency framework and requiring 
increased transparency and shared resources. The six themes identified were 1) increasing 
education to establish and maintain awareness, 2) conducting outreach, 3) building 
capacity, 4) shaping policy, 5) establishing norms, and 6) enforcing those norms. Each 
theme contained factors of DIMEFIL, and while this strategy is specific to additive 
manufacturing in Singapore, it is also applicable to many other counterproliferation 
concerns for the Singapore country team.136 
The first of the themes, increasing education to establish and maintain awareness, 
centered on improving understanding of potential positive additive manufacturing uses, 
characteristics of the industry, and potential negative applications related to WMD and 
proliferation. Identifying actors in the public, private, academic, and international sectors 
leads to the second theme of outreach. Critical is U.S. government-agency appreciation of 
private industry stakeholders, those developing additive manufacturing and its relative 
technology and equipment, to ensure cooperation and awareness of market sensitivities to 
overregulation.  
                                                 
134 Department of State, “Embassy Singapore Finds Value.” 
135 Votel, “White Paper: The Gray Zone,” 7. 
136 Ibid. 
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Outreach to industry leaders, government institutions, and agencies—including 
national laboratories, the intelligence community, international business, and government 
actors—must be tailored and approached through appropriate channels.137 In this theme, 
transparency through unity of effort and message is crucial to evoking a positive response 
and willingness to support building capacity. Options to mitigate the threat posed by 
additive manufacturing can be developed by working with stakeholders to ensure equities 
are considered before regulation or actions are taken that could impact global markets.138 
Further, outreach can deepen IA ability to identify or develop indications and warnings 
that increase awareness and deepen understanding of rapidly developing technology. 
Many institutions within the U.S. government build partner capacity, but no 
agency should do this unilaterally.139 When efforts are not synchronized or deconflicted, 
partner forces become overtasked and oversaturated with training events and scope of 
responsibility. As observed by the CPWG, many of the same foreign units become the 
focus of a wide array of training and capacity-building programs. Often a result of 
personal relationships, foreign politics, or limited capacity of the host nation, capacity 
building can lead to a watering down of capability. Coordinated efforts, prioritized 
through the country team mission, can tailor capacity-building efforts and maximize 
marginal gains through expensive programs.  
The CPWG identified shaping U.S. policy to integrate additive manufacturing 
nonproliferation and counterproliferation themes as an aspect of overarching CWMD 
strategies. The speed and agility of U.S. policy development is often spurred by demand 
from those carrying out actions forward, like the military on the ground or the U.S. 
embassy team in a foreign state. Sending a demand signal to decision makers in 
                                                 
137 The Commerce Department, Bureau of Industry and Security website lists many of the programs 
available to industry and government entities to inform actors about export controls and U.S. requirements. 
The site can be accessed at http://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/compliance-a-training/export-administration-
regulations-training. 
138 Will Yakowicz, “Why Regulation Is Ruining the U.S. Economy,” Inc., 2013, 
http://www.inc.com/will-yakowicz/why-regulation-is-ruining-us-economy.html.  
139 Examples of capacity-building programs can be found in DOD, DOJ, DOS, and DHS, to name a 
few. Often, the recipient of training is the same host-nation unit, group of individuals, or partnered agency 
responsible for multiple tasks including military, legal, law enforcement, and customs action.  
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Washington, DC could increase the speed of policy, allowing it better to keep pace with 
emerging and rapidly advancing technologies. Unfortunately, the capacity of the U.S. 
government, international intelligence, and law enforcement frameworks is not robust 
enough to observe and act on every threat. Dependence on industry and private actors to 
self-regulate emerges in the following two themes. 
The CPWG identified a straightforward solution to the additive manufacturing 
issue: develop a code of conduct. If education and outreach can be bolstered by policy, 
international agreements, regimes and treaties, capacity building, and law enforcement 
frameworks then establishing a balanced and complimentary set of norms between 
government and industry can promote industry self-regulation. Capitalizing on existing 
methods of educating industry about the potential dangers of additive manufacturing, 
private industry can be incentivized to protect things like intellectual property or 
proprietary processes and equipment. This would reduce the resource burden on U.S. and 
international partners. This approach has been effective in several industries involving 
dangers from dual-use technologies.140 If successful, government and industry can 
partner to decrease diffusion of technology barriers, increase indications and warning 
without overregulation, and minimize instances where enforcement is required through 
government resources.  
The final theme, enforcement of norms, includes actions utilizing all available 
levers of national soft, hard and smart power to effectively combine multiple authorities, 
access, placement, and capabilities.141 U.S. bureaucratic institutions are well positioned 
to align against threats that are visible and pose dangers to national security. The six-
theme strategy developed by the CPWG increased awareness that led to whole-of-
government options. Outreach and partnership with private industry avoids 
                                                 
140 Richard Re, “PlayStation 2 Detonation: Controlling the Threat of Dual-Use Technologies,” 
Harvard International Review 25, no. 3 (fall 2003): 46–50. 
141 The term “smart power” is defined as the ability to effectively combine both hard and soft power. 
Joseph S. Nye, “Public Diplomacy and Soft Power.” The Annals of the American Academy of Political 
Science, vol. 616, no. 1: 94-109, 107. 
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overregulation while simultaneously increasing awareness, indications, and warnings, 
without burdensome requirements, budgets, or added layers of bureaucracy.142  
Additional investment in the development and execution of related 
exercises that brought together counterparts from Washington and relevant 
field offices—thereby linking research and development, policy, and 
implementing stakeholders—could provide a very powerful tool to 
identify solutions for issues of significant interest to the U.S. government. 
The exercise clearly demonstrated that the OA process effectively 
generates “soft power” feasible options for immediate implementation by 
senior policy decision makers.143 
Specific to Singapore, the ambassador and his country team reflected on how such 
a strategy could promote the government of that country, both internally and as a regional 
leader. A key element is shaping the evolution of additive manufacturing in the 
commercial sector toward legitimate applications. Singapore is investing $400 million in 
a five-year advanced-manufacturing project focused on 3D printing, a fact highlighted 
through the OA process, increasing additive manufacturing concerns for regional U.S. 
missions.144 This opens the opportunity to shape additive manufacturing proliferation 
concerns by leveraging Singapore’s desire for prestige among regional competitors, as 
pointed out by Ambassador Wagar. Examining potential over-the-horizon threats to 
develop whole-of-government strategies, as through the OA TTX in Singapore, shows 
the utility of a formal process in tackling real-world issues and promoting strategic U.S. 
interest abroad. 
B. ASSESSING THE IMPACT ON EACH DIMENSION OF 
COLLABORATION  
Expectations of the CPWG’s performance during the TTX were high. The team is 
inherently interagency and exercises a broad range of authorities on a daily basis. 
Members employ streamlined and agile decision making that is uncommon in larger 
                                                 
142 These trade-offs are explored in Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis, “The Revenge of Homo 
Economicus: Contested Exchange and the Revival of Political Economy,” Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 7, no. 1 (Winter 1993): 83–102. 
143 Department of State, “Embassy Singapore Finds Value.” 
144 Brooke, “China Flexes Muscles.” 
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government organizations. Regional partners and leadership from Washington, DC were 
invited to participate, in an effort to increase networking for the CPWG core team and 
demonstrate how the OA process can enhance collaboration in an efficient and timely 
manner. These points need to be highlighted, that though marginal increases in 
collaboration were observed, the absolute results cannot be attributed solely to the factors 
under consideration here. In other words, the Singapore CPWG group’s success may not 
be observed across all cases.   
We operationalized the dependent variable—collaboration—using our three 
dimensions discussed above: transparency, resource sharing, and interdependence (see 
Appendix A). We anticipated a range of responses and observations, with an overall net 
benefit of enhanced collaboration. More specifically, we expected to observe increased 
awareness through the contributions from multiple perspectives and expected an 
improved willingness to share information and ideas to create greater transparency. Given 
the current fiscal situation and continued sequestration, the process was designed to 
minimize the need for additional funding and resources, but we expected strong views on 
the staffing and time requirements. This is why we chose one of the few existential 
threats to security—nuclear WMD. Interdependence was expected to increase primarily 
through greater awareness of mutual reliance among partners, as adjacent organizations’ 
goals, capabilities, and weaknesses became apparent through increased transparency. We 
primarily examined the willingness to compromise, engage in a shared decision-making 
process, and form goal-directed partnerships based on requirements. The following is our 
analysis of each of these dimensions of the dependent variable: 
1. Transparency 
The proliferation of WMD is a complex societal problem. Countering it requires 
greater sharing, delegation, communication, and understanding of other interests or, in 
our terminology, transparency. The most significant features of OA that impacted 
transparency, as noted by TTX participants, were the use of a common language, the 
enabling of open and honest discussion, and the ability of the most viable organization to 
take the lead toward a solution (given the specific concept proposed). One participant of 
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the OA TXX at the U.S. Embassy to Singapore commented on the increased transparency 
enabled by the OA methodology, “by listening [and understanding] various 
organization’s perspective, capabilities and resources, we were able to better understand 
how we can support, which in turn created an atmosphere conducive towards proactive 
engagement.”145 Another OA TTX participant remarked on how highlighting one 
organizations weakness provided insight as to how another organization could provide 
support,  
The construct of the exercise provided a setting for individual agencies to 
provide overviews of existing capabilities and weaknesses in a non-
threatening way. By focusing discussion of weaknesses or gap in an 
interagency context, it encouraged discussion of potential issues and 
problems between agencies and departments.146 
We observed the ability of an academic language, as opposed to organization-
specific jargon and doctrine, to defuse biases and promote the sharing of ideas and 
information. The use of a common language permitted individual agencies to provide 
existing capabilities and weaknesses in a nonthreatening way. By focusing on 
information gaps within the seams of the interagency, the process encouraged discussion 
of potential problems between agencies and departments and effectively drew out the 
subtleties of each discrete idea. Due to the scenario focusing on steady state initiatives, 
the IA focused on respective organizational capabilities to take lead or support as 
necessary to achieve innovative solutions. 
Of particular note was that the CPWG and the IA in the U.S. Embassy to 
Singapore lacked an understanding of what the DOD does in the counterproliferation 
mission space. Learning the DOD’s role in the counterproliferation steady state was 
valuable for the IA; likewise, gaining awareness of what various agencies bring to the 
table during the preparation line of effort was valuable to the DOD representatives. The 
structure of the process and user-friendly communication tools (SharePoint) facilitated 
real-time information sharing that brought about transparency, which led to these 
                                                 
145 Appendix C: OA TTX Participant Responses, U.S. Embassy to Singapore, 25 August, 2015 
146 Ibid. 
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conclusions on the part of participants. In sum, transparency proved to be the dimension 
of collaboration most significantly increased. The exercise provided the opportunity for 
participants to uncover areas for substantial joint benefit simply through the systematic 
revealing of their attributes. The venue location provided a notable interaction effect with 
the application of the OA process as the pre-existing personal relationships among the 
CPWG, as well as the signal of approval from the Ambassador fostered such unfettered 
exchange. 
2. Resource Provision 
Budgetary control and capital provision from leadership within an organization 
and from outside sponsors are key elements affecting the commitment of resources to a 
collaborative effort. Working from the collective understanding that collaboration is not 
possible without people, money, and time, participants noted what aspects of OA most 
impact the sharing of resources—personnel selected for the collaborative effort, minimal 
funding requirements, and connection of exercise outcomes with decision makers. An 
OA TTX participant observed, “in the current budget environment, it is very difficult to 
increase program funding levels and I don’t see this process as changing that, unless it 
was because another organization was willing to redirect its resources to the greater inter-
organizational effort.”147 
Choosing the right person for the job was crucial. We encouraged participant 
involvement from each organization, from top to bottom, to enhance the process. Some 
organizations had representation from the strategic, operational, and tactical levels, 
helping to facilitate vertical collaboration and create demand signals for resources. The 
burden to do so was lightened considerably as there was no visible need to increase 
funding levels in order to exercise the collaborative process. Aside from appropriate 
staffing, the most prominent resource draw noted by participants was the time 
commitment of dedicating staff to a collaborative effort in the preparation/preventative 
stage. One participant commented on time and space resources, 
                                                 
147 Ibid. 
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There is always room for improvement, and this exercise introduced some 
ideas for doing so, at a minimum by providing the space to focus 
exclusively on the issue for an extended period of time. The challenge of 
course is carving out such space with all the competing demands on our 
time. Figuring out a way to create such space would be a start.148 
In sum, resource sharing proved to show a mild increase, relative to the other 
dimensions of collaboration. The sharing of significant resources by the Ambassador 
provided a clear signal to the participants. Resource commitment by actors at the 
embassy level is, however, constrained. The embassy venue, in this case, may limit 
increase in this dimension of collaboration, as opposed to locating collaboration efforts 
within the NCR.     
3. Interdependence 
In the interorganizational framework, the manifest function is collaboration that 
leads to goal congruence, indicated by the level of mutual reliance among entities. The 
most significant qualities of OA that impacted interdependence, as noted by TTX 
participants, consisted of understanding other agency authorities at different stages of 
discussion; greater understanding that the whole-of-government approach includes 
academic institutions, IA, and industry partners; and the importance of developing 
personal relationships through collaborative efforts. Taking directly from the response of 
one OA TXX participant on interorganizational collaboration, 
The main reward of collaboration within our organization is opportunity. 
Interaction with other organizations and groups gives us the ability to 
build relationships that will provide the unit with additional information, 
access, and placement. The relationships we establish extend our network 
and provide us with more intelligence gathering and analysis 
opportunities.149 
A complementary effect, as evidenced by overlapping dimensions, was that 
increased transparency also led to more positive interdependence throughout the process. 
Use of a common language, the shifting of lead between agencies and departments given 




the specific problem, and having representation from national, regional, and country-team 
levels all made it easier for participants to rely on other organizations. In one example, a 
participant stated that OA “improved awareness and appreciation for policy and academic 
alliance as an instrument of national power to assist and solve intractable IA problem 
sets.”150 The representation at different levels within the same organization improved 
awareness vertically so intra-organization members could better understand the 
requirements at each level of the organization. One participant remarked, “alternative 
future planning can be utilized for steady state problem solving; necessary to bridge NCR 
decision makers with country team operations; this process is one way to exercise and 
influence policy decision making.”151 
For some, the process highlighted their own limitations, especially left of crisis, 
and showed them that it was in their organizations’ best interests to let other agencies 
take the lead. This realization stemmed from observing that authorities within other 
organizations can make a compromise on their side of the fence, strengthening a position 
on the other side. The ability to dual track between administrative and criminal 
procedures allowed flexibility without actual compromise.152 Regarding the collaborative 
problem solving process, a participant noted, “We were encouraged to piggyback off 
other organizations’ comments and efforts; to use their actions as a springboard for other 
ideas.”153 
Developing personal relationships as a byproduct of collaborative efforts was 
noted to be of high importance to improve organizational relationships, leading to greater 
transparency, resource sharing, and interdependence. The process helped develop these 
relationships and found one of the keys to “success [to be] pre-existing and mature 
relationships, making it important to capture human capital profile.”154 The combination 







of horizontal and vertical collaboration, made possible by organizational representation 
from varying levels, led not only to the development of relationships but to greater 
interdependence, making more effective collaboration possible.155 A participant 
commented on the value of organizational relationships,  
Relationship-building is a critical piece in this puzzle. And I’m not talking 
about team-building exercises. I’m talking about the kind of “around the 
table” discussions that have taken place in a professional manner, where 
each person has the opportunity to establish her/his credibility and 
potential contribution, followed by on-the-margin discussions, whether 
around a table or at a social event. People will still need to represent the 
equities of their respective organizations, but relationships can eliminate 
or at least lower barriers that exist due to pre-existing organizational 
culture.156 
In sum, the interdependence dimension of collaboration was the most difficult to 
observe from among the three dimensions. On the one hand, the need for increased 
interdependence was socialized to the participants through the collaborative process. The 
instantiation of such interdependence was, however, limited for a number of reasons. 
First, as argued above, the authority to endorse joint decisions may be held at a higher 
level of authority within each organization. Second, interdependence plays out over time. 
Given the short duration of the Singapore exercise, seeds of interdependence may have 
been planted that will take some months—or years—to mature. It is likely that more 
longitudinal observations will be required to ascertain overall changes in this dimension. 
C. OPPORTUNITY ANALYSIS CONCLUSION 
As evidenced by Ambassador Wagar’s reaction, the introduction of a formal 
collaborative process enhanced U.S. interagency steady-state efforts against a potential 
over-the-horizon counterproliferation threat through increased transparency, resource 
sharing, and interdependent action. Over the course of the exercise, CPWG members 
collectively developed 169 distinct options to address potential counterproliferation uses 
                                                 
155 During and after the OA, we referred to collaboration across departments and agencies at the 
national or regional level as “horizontal collaboration” and the regional–national collaboration as “vertical 
collaboration.” 
156 Appendix C: OA TTX Participant Responses, U.S. Embassy to Singapore, 25 August, 2015 
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for additive manufacturing. Those options combined to form a potential strategy employ 
all elements of national power. The DIMEFIL approach closes information gaps and 
facilitates partnerships with government and industry to shape policy, capacity, norms, 
and enforcement frameworks while minimizing impacts to an expanding global industry. 
While some of these options would have coalesced through normalized ad hoc CPWG 
collaboration, the formal process deepened and broadened approaches that would have 
remained undiscovered. 
Strategies that leverage and incentivize the government of Singapore offer U.S. 
representatives new approaches for building partner capacity and cooperation. While this 
cooperation is important to the mission of the Country Team, potential regional benefits 
may be realized by leveraging Singapore’s role as regional leader.  
Washington, DC leadership and IA partners with regional responsibilities 
augmented the CPWG during the TTX. Not surprisingly, collaboration between 
theater/regional partners was excellent. Unexpectedly, the combination of national-level 
representatives with the regional team resulted in far richer dialogue and a deeper 
appreciation of both the regional and national dynamics for the whole team, enhancing 
the vertical coordination of enablers and producing integrated options.  
We received two important recommendations and critical insights from the U.S. 
embassy team that fell outside our intended research question. A deeper discussion will 
take place in the following chapter; however, they are relevant to this analysis and worth 
mentioning here. The first recommendation was to institutionalize a formal collaborative 
process, like OA, into all U.S. interagency training pipelines. This effort would 
synchronize future collaboration so that all IA players have a working knowledge of a 
shared methodology to increase outcomes in future efforts.157  
                                                 
157 “Going forward, the Embassy’s CPWG strongly recommends that OA and the results of this 
exercise be briefed to key offices in the U.S. government engaged in CP and other over-the-horizon threats, 
including at various training facilities such as the State Department’s Foreign Service Institute (FSI), the 
FBI Academy, and the DHS Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC).” Department of State, 
“Embassy Singapore Finds Value.” 
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The second recommendation was to conduct similar tabletop exercises in other 
interagency environments. Recognizing that OA is scalable, embassy team remarked that 
improvements in regional strategy would benefit from the introduction of other embassy 
teams and subsequent events held inside another country’s embassy. Applied to the IA as 
a whole, we argue a formal process could improve outcomes where whole-of-government 
strategies and options tackle issues in the steady state before a crisis emerges—or post 
crises to future trajectories.  
The first of two insights suggests the use of neutral language to overcome lexical 
and cultural friction is crucial to collaboration. Each agency brought biases and unique 
processes often inhibitive to collaboration. An academic approach, where acronyms and 
specific nomenclature were minimized, supported open discussion and unconstrained 
problem solving in which all members understood the inputs provided and how options 
related to individual efforts. This allowed free debate and discussion to diverge from 
institutional mindsets. 
The second insight is the supporting role the Department of Defense can play in 
steady state efforts. Over the 15 years, the DOD has broadly increased capability and 
capacity to respond to a wide range of challenges. However, in addressing these 
challenges, DOD has become accustomed to primacy. In the steady state, Outside 
Theaters of Active Armed Conflict (ODTAAC) where diplomatic and law enforcement 
efforts largely lead, DOD can support other department and agency efforts. However, a 
resounding theme over the course of this research is a limited understanding of “how” to 
plug into DOD capability and capacity, especially as it pertains to SOF. 
In the following chapter, we show diverse outcomes across the breadth of 
research—CWMD, technology, and bureaucratic institutions—affecting interagency 
collaboration in the counterproliferation mission space. The growth in complexity in the 
mission space, due to technology and to departmental authorities not aligning against 
modern threats, demands greater collaboration in a fiscally constrained environment. The 
formation of new bureaucracies as a response to nontraditional threats further 
complicates collaboration. Chapter V summarizes these challenges to instigate future 
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research, recommend approaches to breaching organizational barriers, and propose ways 







V. CONCLUSIONS  
We are one network; it is one of our greatest attributes and we must both 
leverage our innate ability to network internally and grow our network of 
partners and facilitators such that we continue to provide our commanders 
and decision makers with the best advice when called to do so. 
—General Joseph L. Votel158 
 
Weapons of mass destruction remain one of the greatest existential threats to U.S. 
national security and economic prosperity. Nation State and non-state threats echo a 
rhetoric indicating likely WMD use against western targets, although the timeframe for 
such attacks remains unclear. The U.S. Interagency is made up of hierarchical 
organizations. These separate and distinct hierarchical departments and agencies, each 
with individual organizational missions and goals, have evolved into large stove-piped 
institutions of fiscal accountability and responsibility.159 Adversaries of the United States 
may have the ability to exploit vulnerable seams between interagency departments. As 
GEN Votel writes, “The National Security Act of 1947 served us well, but in an era far 
removed from the Cold War, the United States needs a new construct for the 21st 
Century. There is widespread agreement that going forward, we will require an 
unprecedented level of Interagency (IA) coordination capable of synchronizing all 
elements of national power.”160 
Diffusion of emerging technology and disruptive innovation are lowering the 
barrier to entry for illicit networks and malign actors seeking WMD materials and 
technologies. However, these emerging technologies and disruptive innovations are 
predominantly positive contributions to the marketplace and society, which further 
complicates the issue from a security perspective. As a result, strict export control 
                                                 
158 Joseph Votel, “White Paper: The Gray Zone,” United States Special Operations Command, 
September 9, 2015, Introduction. 
159 Krebs, “Organizational Hierarchy: Adapting Old Structures to New Challenges.” 
160 Votel, “White Paper: The Gray Zone,” 6. 
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regulations on dual use technology and international agreements and frameworks 
regarding the proliferation of WMD-related tools and materials may be inapplicable. For 
instance, additive manufacturing printers could feasibly 3D print sophisticated equipment 
needed in the nuclear fuel cycle. While the international community closely scrutinizes 
the transfer of sophisticated nuclear fuel cycle equipment, the purchase of an additive 
manufacturing printer is nearly unnoticed and unregulated. To further exacerbate the 
issue, new technology significantly reduces signatures normally associated with 
identification a uranium production facility.161 The effectiveness of existing controls and 
enforcement frameworks, which have been successful for many years, are slowly 
diminishing. 
A formal collaborative process, like Opportunity Analysis, develops multiple 
collective approaches to the technology issue. Of the nearly 170 steady-state 
counterproliferation approaches developed in Singapore, most centered around 
diplomatic and law enforcement outreach programs. These programs leverage industry to 
establish norms and standards, suggesting a degree of self-regulation within the 
Singapore-based additive manufacturing community of practice, and partners with the 
multilateral effort to deter illicit or malign production of WMD-related technologies. This 
outreach, coupled with successive, scalable and varied Opportunity Analysis exercises 
between government and commercial enterprises, can contribute to broader awareness of 
activities in science, technology and marketplace spaces. These partnerships provoke 
early discussions to inform policy and strategy. Moreover, these discussions, relative to 
the U.S. marketplace, have the propensity to find balance between national security 
interests and marketplace innovations. Further, formal vertical and horizontal interagency 
collaboration affords more comprehensive assessments of malign networks by coalescing 
multiple complex inputs. The collective picture exposes respective departmental 
assessments and perspectives invisible to other government contemporaries. Broader, 
collective visibility allows for the development of multiple, comprehensive proactive, 
reactive, and steady-state approaches capable of being rapidly executed or developed into 
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a policy position or comprehensive strategy. The collaborative interagency strategy 
encourages synchronized multilateral engagements with partner nation commercial, law 
enforcement, defense, and intelligence partners.   
Our research show the value of a formal collaboration process, like OA, to breach 
institutional boundaries and biases, and capable of forming a cohesive, interagency 
approaches to specific problems. These interagency team approaches achieve heightened 
transparency through the cultivation of trust, a willingness to expose mission enablers to 
inform interdependence benefits, and the value of resource sharing. In a time of fiscal 
constraints, when government reorganization is not likely and added bureaucracies create 
new obstacles for cooperation and collaboration, OA creates bridges across departmental 
fissures without compelling new layers of complexity. The scalability of OA allows for 
wide use of the collaborative process at tactical, action officer, staff, and national policy-
making levels. 
The choice of language emerged as a key factor in our study. In the OA TTX, we 
attempted to replace organizational specific language with the neutral – and in some ways 
“universal” – language of academia. This use of academic language had to two 
noteworthy impacts. First, it provided an actual common language that all could 
understand. Second, it defused the inherent conflict among organizations by not 
privileging one group. Our subsequent analysis showed that the language, concepts, and 
acronyms employed (or consciously not employed) during the exercise exerted a 
substantial impact on the outcomes. This result reflects the degree to which discourse, 
meaning, and power relationships are intertwined; in the language of the French 
philosopher Michel Foucault these are “knowledge-power” relations.162 In this work, he 
argues that modern states develop micro-practices of discourse that contain and display 
power relations: “modern power touches individuals via the various forms of constraints 
constitutive of their social practices,” and that these “practices [especially language] are 
more fundamental than belief systems when it comes to understanding the hold that 
                                                 
162 Michel Foucault,  Power/Knowledge, ed. Colin Gordon (New York: Pantheon, 1980). 
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power has on us.”163  For individual members of organizations, this “deep power 
structure” takes hold “to the extent that meanings become fixed or reified in certain 
forms, which then articulate practices, agents and relations, this fixity is power. Power is 
the apparent order of taken-for-granted categories of existence, as they are fixed and 
represented in a myriad discursive forms and practices.”164 Further, studies conducted of 
the relationships between bureaucratic organizations, with the intent of understanding 
how the Foucauldian notion of knowledge/power “has emerged as a pivotal concept in 
explaining the process by which certain organizational and institutional structures prevail 
over others.”165 These insights are crucial as interagency efforts move forward, as the 
defusing of the discourse/power conflict is a relatively cheap and easily manipulated 
factor that can be optimized in future collaborative efforts. As Foucault would argue, 
information sharing could potentially level the power of the actors in the network. 
As expected, there was variation in gains among the three dimensions of 
collaboration, resulting from the choice of venue. There was an immediate willingness to 
share resources (staff and time) on the part of the Ambassador. OA significantly 
increased the level of transparency in horizontal collaboration, while some small gains 
were made in vertical collaboration due to the presence of decision makers from the 
NCR. Based on our interviews, we discerned that the creative solutions that resulted from 
the collaboration led participants to start thinking about what resource sharing and greater 
interdependence might look like in the future. Resource sharing, for an embassy, goes 
beyond traditional budgetary perspectives. Resource sharing is inclusive of personal 
networks and relationships that can be shared and leveraged to support the broader 
country team goals. The uncovering of different capabilities and authorities that occurred 
due to increased transparency led to a greater awareness for the need to increase the other 
two dimensions. Just like any relationship, interdependence and a willingness to share 
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resources takes time. The more collaborative engagements that the IA takes part in with a 
formal approach to the process, we are likely to see more significant increases in all three 
dimensions over time.  
The results from Singapore were gratifying; yet, the impact of ‘selection effects’, 
upon these results, cannot be ignored. The CPWG was a cohesive team prior to the 
exercise. As a result of Ambassador Wagar’s influence on his country team, the team was 
incentivized to participate. The outcome of the process—in this case, 169 distinct 
concepts developed through the OA process—was influenced by existing efficiencies. 
While the intent behind the venue selection was to examine a formal collaboration 
process against a high performance team, like the CPWG, the positive outcomes also 
reflect the existing nature of the group. Therefore, the results of the Singapore exercise 
cannot be expected in all other venues—future research will be needed to scope out the 
precise marginal effect of applying OA within other sets of conditions.   
In sum, this research paper has shown the degree to which U.S. Interagency 
steady-state collaboration can be enhanced for the counterproliferation mission space 
through the use of a formal collaborative process, as well as the venue in which 
collaborative efforts occur. These results are important, as the counterproliferation space 
is growing in complexity due largely to the diffusion of emerging technology and 
disruptive innovation coupled with the vulnerable seams of a Cold War-legacy 
bureaucratic system. This research supports the argument that vulnerability and threat 
assessments are enhanced through the use of a formal collaborative process such as 
Opportunity Analysis. Second, we confirm formal collaboration processes are effective 
tools, but may be have different impacts, contingent upon the venue within which such 
efforts take place.   
A. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Concerted efforts to find and utilize a common vocabulary among interagency 
participants at the Singapore tabletop exercise produced unanticipated results. We 
employed simple language based on the academic lexicon to permeate through 
organizational boundaries. Our collective observations confirmed the importance of 
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effective communication across interagency cultures. However, this experience is 
typically associated with greater familiarity of other organization’s specialized terms, 
especially acronyms. More rigorous effort across the interagency is needed to reinforce 
the use of neutral lexicons. Follow-on research in this area will provide useful insights 
into the observed effectiveness of a common language among interagency partners. 
A second, unexpected, result of the study is the degree of vertical collaboration 
potentially absent in modern constructs. The Washington, DC participants from the 
Departments of State, Commerce, Homeland Security, and the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, respectively, provided necessary insights and atmospherics on current 
national policy deliberation that are less likely to be socialized at the U.S. embassy level. 
While the intent of our research was to observe horizontal collaboration across the 
Interagency, the unanticipated horizontal collaboration demonstrated is indicative of 
further academic research and increased emphasis inter-organizationally. 
An important recommendation for the Department of Defense, with an emphasis 
on Special Operations Command, is the need for increased outreach and education to the 
interagency counterproliferation community of practice. During both observations, in the 
OCT 14 CENTCOM exercise and the AUG 15 Singapore exercise, a common 
perspective expressed by interagency colleagues suggests a limited awareness of DOD 
and SOF authorities, capabilities, and capacities that can be supportive of interagency 
efforts in the steady state CP mission space. Following a number of interjections provided 
by DOD and/or SOF professionals, interagency colleagues sought insight into accessing 
these authorities, capabilities, and capacities. In particular, SOF’s on-the-ground insights 
from its global deployments may be valuable to other members of the IA.  
B. WAY FORWARD   
The interagency should move forward to improve counterproliferation and 
collaboration efforts by investing resources in the following areas: First, a virtual 
collaboration space for the counterproliferation community.  This single platform needs 
to permeate the variety of classified and unclassified networks.  Second, 
institutionalization of Opportunity Analysis across the diplomatic, military, and law 
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enforcement training centers for entry-level action officers provides a low-cost medium 
enabling collaboration without the expenditure of adding bureaucracy to the National 
Security apparatus.  Lastly, SOF outreach to interagency programs, through existing 
Special Operations Support Teams and embassy points of contact, provide a low cost 
medium to rapidly educate interagency colleagues on existing authorities, capabilities, 
and capacity relevant to supporting IA.  
1. Online U.S. Interagency Counterproliferation Collaboration 
Environment 
In the near term, providing a more robust virtual collaboration space for 
counterproliferation-related forums may narrow existing fissures in both horizontal and 
vertical collaborative efforts. While email is the most common medium across the 
counterproliferation community, access to a secure platform for U.S. Interagency 
collaborators to connect serves to align interests through directories while expanding 
awareness through blogs and other modern social media tools. Platforms of this nature, 
some that already exists, require access to a number of unsecure and secure networks. 
Currently, CWMD Systems is forwarding similar efforts through the Constellation 
Program. 
2. Institutionalization of Opportunity Analysis across the U.S. 
Interagency 
OSD developed the OA process for CWMD environments, but the methodology 
can be applied to multiple arenas where interagency collaboration is required. Outcomes 
of OA exercises have formed flexible, multidimensional approaches, collectively leading 
to a scalable and comprehensive strategies to deal with complex issues like those 
presented. Given the baseline requirement of an education to work in a U.S. government 
profession, OA’s use of academic lexicon is applicable to a wide range of departments 
and agencies interested in improving interagency collaboration by increasing 
transparency, interdependence, and resource sharing. 
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3. SOF Outreach to Interagency Partners 
U.S. Special Operations Command operators are selected and trained to be aware 
of cultural sensitivities and perspectives. USSOF operators retain authorities and 
responsibilities—soon to grow with the discussion of USSOCOM taking on increased 
responsibility in the CWMD mission space—to conduct operations that support or can be 
supported by IA colleagues. However, the lack of understanding of SOF’s authority, 
capability, and capacity among IA teammates suggest a need for more focused SOF 
outreach programs through the many liaison elements currently existing in the nation’s 
capital and embassies around the world. Interactions with IA colleagues over the past 
year largely suggest a broad interest in accessing USSOCOM programs. Further, there is 
a generation of SOF and interagency actors who are very experienced in collaborative 
environments as a result of the recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. These individuals 
will begin to fill key IA roles and be able to capitalize from a formal process like OA. 
Additional research and development is recommended to refine the role of ‘facilitator’ 
within the OA process. In an effort to increase repeatability and application, a training 
course should be developed so that other organizations can become OA practitioners for 
interagency collaboration as well as intra-organizationally. Finally, our field study 
benefitted by taking place within a non-threatening, “academic” atmosphere. Future 
facilitators of OA should take note of this fact and plan accordingly.  
Stemming from this research, efforts at fostering collaboration are moving 
forward and gathering steam. U.S. Congress, the National Security Council, Defense 
Innovation Unit Experimental (DIUx), academia, and influencers in the private sector 
have been exposed to the results of this field study. More work needs to be done, 
however, to synchronize our nation’s efforts to confront future proliferation challenges.   
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APPENDIX A.  CONSTRUCTING THE CONCEPT OF 
COLLABORATION 
The term collaboration is often used informally; here, we use the work of Gary 
Goertz to operationalize the concept. He introduced the idea of a concept-indicator 
validity model (Figure 5), in which “the theoretical … structure of the indicator 
corresponds to that of the concept. If the correspondence is weak, then concept-indicator 
validity is low (and vice versa).”166 This structure was, in turn, used to rigorously 
organize data gathered through a series of interviews, observations, and qualitative 
analysis of sources (see Appendix B). 
Figure 5.  Concept-Indicator Validity Model 
  
 
A. DIMENSION 1: TRANSPARENCY 
Transparent accounting for the management of financial assets and liabilities, in 
both the private and public sectors, is an obligation to the stakeholders;167 by contrast, 
bureaucracies’ historical view of the management of nonfinancial assets and liabilities 
has been to “increase the superiority of the professionally informed by keeping their 
knowledge and intentions secret. Bureaucratic administration … in so far as it can … 
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hides its knowledge and action from criticism.”168 While anecdotal evidence suggests that 
complete transparency is unattainable within bureaucracies and interorganizational 
collaborations, the current trend is toward increasing transparency for more favorable 
outcomes.169 The results are significant: 
Again and again, studies show that companies that rate high in 
transparency tend to outperform more opaque ones. In a global study of 
corporate transparency conducted in 2005, for example, the 27 U.S. firms 
that appeared among the 34 most transparent companies beat the S&P 500 
by 11.3% between February 2004 and February 2005.170 
That being said, transparency between organizations presents more challenges 
than full disclosure to stakeholders. Indicators I–V in our model represent what we found 
to be the most significant of transparency. Indicators include: 
I. Willingness to share information 
II. Willingness to delegate authority to facilitate information sharing 
III. Effectiveness of communication tools and technology 
IV. Effect on career advancement of participants 
V. Understanding the relationship of the work of all participants 
The willingness and/or need to share information within an organization is driven 
by the overall agency culture and subcultures.171 Each requires “different data, 
information, or knowledge to do its work, has different abilities, different perspectives 
and ways of gathering information that require translation to other entities, and uses the 
outputs differently.”172 A clear understanding of these differences by all the players, 
especially the leadership, is key to effective interorganizational collaboration. 
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Leaders within government organizations often tout the importance of 
information sharing, but also recognize the vulnerabilities and the requirement to 
consider “substantial informational, technical, human, managerial, process, cultural, 
structural, strategic, and political barriers.”173 At the heart of the barriers is not only the 
individuals’ willingness to share information but their incentive to do so. Career officials 
in government agencies must see room for advancement within the organization and 
believe their actions are leading them toward that end.174 If they see that collaborative 
efforts are coupled with promotional opportunities, the willingness to delegate, share, and 
communicate effectively increases. The ability to do so within an interagency 
environment often relies on tools such as facilitators, proper workspace, and technology. 
While sharing information certainly relies on technology, technology itself is not 
a necessity for effective collaboration,175 which is why the technology component is 
combined with communication tools including the processes and facilitators of 
collaboration. “What is most sorely needed for collaborative solutions to complex 
societal problems is the ability to recognize and benefit from the contributions of multiple 
perspectives.”176 Undoubtedly, the proliferation of WMD is a complex societal problem 
that requires greater sharing, delegation, communication, and understanding of other 
interests, or, as we have come to know it, transparency. 
B. DIMENSION 2: RESOURCES 
In a 2014 report to Congress, the United States Government Accountability Office 
(GAO) listed the following key considerations for interagency collaborative mechanisms:  
• Funding for the collaborative mechanisms themselves 
• Staffing for the collaborative mechanisms 
• Inventory of resources dedicated toward interagency outcomes 
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• Leveraging of related agency resources toward the group’s outcomes 
• Pilot testing of new collaborative ideas, programs, or policies before 
investing resources177 
The other key components of the GAO report were leadership, accountability, and 
outcomes, which point to organizational structure. While these elements were 
differentiated as implementation approaches to collaboration, within our concept-
indicator structure, they do not independently indicate collaboration. Indicators VI–X of 
our model parallel the GAO’s key considerations and fall under the dimension of 
resources as essential to collaboration. Indicators include: 
VI. Willingness to invest resources to accomplish group goals 
VII. Sufficient skilled personnel 
VIII. Rewards connected to building enduring collaborative 
relationships 
IX. Effect on future commitment of human/financial resources for 
collaborative training 
X. Adequate structures for collaboration 
Economist Steven Landsburg said, “Most of economics can be summarized in 
four words: ‘People respond to incentives.’ The rest is commentary.”178 We see this 
supported not only by the actions of individuals but by the organizations they represent as 
well. So while “building strong and resilient networks among individuals and 
organizations is a likely precondition for the eventual long-term substantive success of 
network projects,” budgetary consequences play a large role in the level of resource 
provision an organization is willing to commit.179 New functions within an organization 
are commonly evaluated by whether or not the added responsibilities will lead to 
budgetary increases or just more work for the same pay.180  
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On the other hand, more money is not always the dominant incentive. Control 
over budgets is often more appealing than budget increases. “Organizations are often 
prepared to accept less money with greater control rather than more money with less 
control.”181 Budgetary control and capital provisions from leadership within an 
organization, in addition to sponsors outside the organization, are seen as key 
mechanisms affecting the commitment of resources to a collaborative effort.  
C. DIMENSION 3: INTERDEPENDENCE 
The third section of indicators deals with organizations’ willingness to tie their 
fortunes to the group, and falls under the umbrella of interdependence. No organization 
can exist as an island; varying degrees of interdependence are inherent in interaction. 
Building off the functionalism theory made popular by Spencer, Durkheim, and Merton, 
Talcott Parsons described intended consequences commonly recognized as the manifest 
function of any organization.182 In the interorganizational framework, the manifest 
function is defined as collaboration that leads to goal congruence, indicated by the level 
of interdependence among entities. 
Notably, interdependence differs from resource commitment and transparency in 
that increased interdependence, while vital to collaboration, does not necessarily equate 
to enhancement of desired outcomes for the group and can actually detract from 
favorable outcomes. The negative possibilities of interdependence are considered within 
management literature, but indicators XI-XVII of our model are categorized by the 
potential positive aspects of interdependence and point to our third essential dimension of 
collaboration.  Indicators include: 
XI. Willingness to compromise own interests to achieve the groups’ 
goals 
XII. Willingness to engage in a shared decision-making process with 
other organizations 
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XIII. Willingness to consider the interests of other organizations in 
planning 
XIV. Willingness to commit to policies/recommendations emerging 
from collaboration 
XV. Formation of partnerships based on requirements 
XVI. Willingness to seek input from other organizations 
XVII. Established goals for interorganizational collaboration 
Multiple challenges stem from the inherent vulnerabilities of interdependence. 
Zhang and Dawes found that policy and legal barriers appear to present the greatest 
obstacles to substantive success of knowledge-networking projects.183 The desire to 
maintain influence can “also lead organizations to avoid opposing a particular policy in 
the belief that to do so would reduce their influence on other issues.”184 Establishing 
goals early in the collaborative process directly affects the formation of partnerships and, 
consequently, the willingness of an organization to mitigate its concerns regarding trust. 
Understanding the differences among agencies and the subcultures within 
agencies is central to identifying barriers and increasing willingness to engage in a shared 
decision-making process with other organizations.185 Based on research by the Brookings 
Institute, we found it valuable to employ a facilitator for the formal collaborative process 
within the CPWMD schema. 
According to the Brookings research, “successfully transferring, integrating, 
creating, and ultimately applying new, useful knowledge requires a collaborative 
‘capacity builder.’ This person would coordinate network activities, handle internal and 
external problems, and ensure the provision of quality service. In the process, capacity 
builders would buttress network integration by communicating with partners, 
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coordinating activities, and building relationships.”186 The capacity builder used in our 
case studies was able to help organizational representatives foster the positive 
interdependence so crucial to goal congruence, not only for successful outcomes in the 
short term but potentially for sustained success for future engagements. 
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APPENDIX B.  CONCEPT DIMENSIONS AND INDICATORS 
After obtaining an Institutional Review Board determination, which concluded the 
present research was not “human subjects research,” we utilized the following question 
set to interview exercise participants. This allowed for a data-gathering plan to align with 
the construction of our “collaboration” concept as outlined in Appendix A.      
A. DIMENSION 1: TRANSPARENCY 
Indicator I. Did the desire to achieve the group’s goals increase your 
organizations’ willingness to share information with other 
organizations? 
 
Indicator II. Did this environment increase the willingness of your organizations’ 
leadership to give people additional authority at lower levels to 
effectively share information with other organizations? 
 
Indicator III. How effective were the communication tools and technologies at 
supporting your inter-organization collaboration? 
 
Indicator IV. Will engaging in inter-organizational activities at work affect career 
advancement for those in your organization? If so, how? 
 
Indicator V. What additional understanding did your organization gain regarding 
how their work relates to the work of other organizations with whom 
they collaborated? 
 
B. DIMENSION 2: RESOURCES 
Indicator VI.  Was your organization willing to invest resources (e.g., funding, 
personnel, equipment) to accomplish inter-organizational goals in 
addition to its own? 
 
Indicator VII.  Was your organization provided with an adequate amount of personnel 
in order to commit the most appropriate representative(s) to participate 
in the inter-organizational collaboration? 
 
Indicator VIII.  In what ways were employees of your organization rewarded for 





Indicator IX.  In what ways might this exercise/event affect your organizations’ 
commitment of human and financial resources to training with other 
organizations? 
 
Indicator X. Did your organizations’ position on the adequacy of structures (e.g., 
liaison roles, teams, task forces) for effective inter-organizational 
collaboration change? 
 
C. DIMENSION 3: INTERDEPENDENCE 
Indicator XI.  Did the exercise affect your organizations’ willingness to compromise 
its own interests in the interest of inter-organizational goals? If so, 
how? 
 
Indicator XII.  How was your organizations’ willingness to engage in a shared 
decision making process with other organizations affected? 
 
Indicator XIII.  How did your organization consider the interests of other 
organizations in its planning? 
 
Indicator XIV.   How—if at all—would your organization commit to any 
recommendations or policies that emerge from such a collaborative 
effort?  
 
Indicator XV.  How effectively did your organization form or modify partnerships as 
requirements changed? 
 
Indicator XVI.  Did this collaboration prompt your organization to seek (more/less/no 
change) input from other organizations? 
 
Indicator XVII. What goals (if any) were clearly established for inter-organizational 
collaboration? 
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